

What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders

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Abstract

Using natural language processing, we identify corporate goals stated in the shareholder letters of the 150 largest companies in the United States from 1955 to 2020. Corporate goals have proliferated, from less than one on average in 1955 to more than 7 in 2020. While in 1955, profit maximization, market share growth, and customer service were dominant goals, today almost all companies proclaim social and environmental goals as well. We examine why firms announce goals and when. We find goal announcements are associated with management's responses to the firm's (possibly changed) circumstances, with the changing power and preferences of key constituencies, as well as from management's attempts to deflect scrutiny. While executive compensation is still overwhelmingly based on financial performance, we do observe a rise in bonus payments contingent on meeting social and environmental objectives. Firms that announce environmental and social goals tend to implement programs intended to achieve those goals, although their impact on outcomes is unclear. The evidence is consistent with firms focusing on shareholder interests while incorporating stakeholder interests as interim goals. Goals also do seem to be announced opportunistically to deflect attention and alleviate pressure on management.

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“Over the years, there have been multiple times” when reading the annual letter of a firm’s management to shareholders “has been a factor in my deciding to do something or not to do something,” stated Warren Buffet in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. “Where I’m the junior or silent partner, I feel better if I’m in partnership with someone who’s on the same wavelength I am and has a sense of stewardship. You can pick up some sense of that from reading the letter.”¹ Despite this strong endorsement, the content of shareholder letters has not been a major area of study. In this paper, we examine shareholder letters to gauge how CEOs project the goals of the company they run, how these goals have changed over time, and why they have changed. In the process, we also try to establish whether these stated goals are just a public relations exercise or whether they make a difference in the ways companies are run.

We collect the shareholder letters of the Fortune-ranked 120 largest non-financial U.S. corporations by revenues and 30 largest financial corporations by assets from 1955 (the first year the Fortune ranking was published) to 2020. To read these letters and identify the goals, we make use of recent advances in Natural Language Processing (NLP), which allow us to identify paragraphs in a letter that express goals and what goals they are (henceforth, we will use the terms “goal”, “objectives”, and “purpose” interchangeably, acknowledging that some authors differentiate between these terms).

We identify 13 goals that appear repeatedly. First, running the company in shareholders’ financial interest, whether termed maximizing profits, increasing return on investment, or reducing costs. Next, enhancing other measures of corporate performance that benefit the entire company, though not necessarily the shareholders, specifically sales or market share growth, innovation, and risk management. Third, running the company for the benefit of other corporate stakeholders: customers, employees, suppliers, the community, and, generically, stakeholders. Finally, focusing on larger societal responsibilities such as ethics; philanthropy; the environment, including emissions and pollution (ESG Environment); and the firm’s social structure (ESG Social), which includes diversity and inclusion.

We start by documenting how the time series of goals evolve. In 1955, barely 33% of the letters contained an explicit goal. Conditional on having a goal, the average number of goals was two. By 1980, almost 80% of the letters contained a goal, and, conditional on having one, the average number of goals was three. By 2020, all letters contained a goal, and the average number of goals was about 7. Thus, the period of our analysis could be divided into two: the early years from 1955 to 1980 when the expansion of goals was mainly in the probability of stating a goal, and the later years (1980-2020) when the expansion was mainly in the number of goals stated. Interestingly, most of the goal changes we see over time are due

¹ <https://jasonzweig.com/its-time-for-investors-to-re-learn-the-lost-art-of-reading/>

to existing companies adopting (or dropping) some goals, not to new companies with a different sets of goals joining the top 150 group.

In the early years of our sample, only 42 percent of the companies mentioning goals included some version of profit maximization as a goal, and none explicitly mentioned the idea of shareholder value maximization. By the late 1990s, virtually all companies mentioning goals indicated a focus on the corporate bottom line as one of their goals, while at the peak 59% of them specifically included a mention of shareholder value maximization. In the 1980s and 1990s, the attention paid to other stakeholders also rose. Between 1980 and the end of the 1990s the percentage of companies including one or more stakeholders (other than shareholders) as an objective increased from around 50 percent to 80 percent. Finally, the attention paid to broader societal goals, such as the environment and diversity, increased from around 20 percent of firms in 1980 to 91 percent in 2020. In the most recent years, even as other goals proliferate, corporations seem to be dropping the term “shareholder value” in their goal statements, even though they emphasize shareholder interests in other ways such as pay.

When we look at the correlation between announced goals, we find two distinctive clusters over time. The first is a “performance” cluster, where objectives of Market Share Growth, Innovation, and a focus on Customers and Employees appear together with shareholder value maximization, suggesting these goals are perceived as complements. In 1955, social and environmental goals are rarely stated. Once they appear, they appear together frequently, along with Community, Ethics, Philanthropy, and, again, Employees. Across companies, the objectives stated in this “societal” cluster have little correlation with objectives in the “performance” cluster (except for Employees). The takeaway is that CEOs that emphasize performance objectives do not emphasize societal objectives and vice versa.

Why do CEOs state goals in shareholder letters? Until the advent of social media, shareholder letters were the most important form of direct communication between the company and all its constituencies. That management communicates with all these audiences simultaneously makes communication more credible (Farrell and Gibbons (1989)). The multiplicity of the audiences also affects the cost of goal proliferation. If shareholders want managers focused only on the bottom line, the declaration of other objectives can detract from the desired single-mindedness. Indeed, it may be hard to hold management responsible when it has a multiplicity of goals. At the same time, for a firm to declare employee safety a priority and then not follow up with action can cost dearly in terms of reputation when accidents occur.

To further examine evidence of why a firm would pick some goals over others, we look primarily at changes. CEOs are likely to internalize the needs of their most important constituencies, emphasizing what the constituencies want to, or need to, hear. We look at changes in the importance of key constituencies to see if that is associated with changes in the announced goals.

Starting in the 1980s, the power of shareholders increased due to an increase in institutional ownership and the rise of hostile takeovers. An increase in foreign competition accounted for a rise in the importance of customers, starting in the mid-1980s. Accordingly, shareholder value and customer objectives became more important. Even the employee objective became more important despite the decline in unionization (the extent of corporate unionization is itself positively correlated, in the cross-section, with an employee goal). The increase in the employee objective is centered in firms where the workforce is highly productive, and employee motivation particularly important.

Changes in the preferences of key constituencies also matter. For instance, as the public's concerns with corporate ethics grew with the Enron, Tyco, and Worldcom scandals in the early 2000s, corporations scrambled to announce an ethics goal. As more of a corporation's institutional investors signed the UN Principles for Responsible Investments (PRI) in the last decade, the emphasis on social and environmental goals also increased

Firms do not simply react passively to changes in constituency power and preferences. Managements announce goals to commit themselves – for instance to fix poor performance. Companies underperforming in terms of profitability or market valuation (Tobin's Q) are more likely to adopt shareholder value as a goal. Companies that are more highly leveraged announce risk management as a goal, while companies that are fined by the Environmental Protection Agency are more likely to declare some environmental goals afterward. Management may also stress a goal when they want to signal commitment to a constituency (or set of constituencies). For instance, firms that do a lot of R&D tend to espouse product innovation as a goal, perhaps signaling how they will allocate resources in the future.

Finally, we do find some evidence of opportunistic goal-embracing, where the intent may be to deflect attention. For instance, firms embroiled in the opioid scandal announced all manner of stakeholder and societal goals suggestive of responsible corporate behavior after the scandal came to light.

The natural question then is whether these goals are purely cosmetic, intended to pacify some internal or external constituency, or whether they do trigger real change inside the companies that adopt these goals. Since 2008, we have detailed data on compensation and compensation philosophy. We show that despite the proliferation of goals, approximately 96 percent of top executive compensation is linked to the company stock price and other financial measures of performance. While the use of non-financial metrics (such as environmental performance) to determine compensation has spread, from 30% of the companies in 2008 to 45% in 2020, these measures, on average, impact only a tiny fraction of overall compensation.

We do find, however, that the presence of environmental and social goals in the shareholder letter is associated with the use of the corresponding metrics in compensation. This is not true for most other goals that are not performance related (e.g., Employee). Why single these out? One interpretation is that many goals (such as a focus on employees) are not in contradiction with long-term shareholder value

maximization, and may indeed be interim goals towards that longer-term goal. In that case, there is no real need to include them separately in compensation. In contrast, the pursuit of environmental or social goals may sometimes be in conflict with shareholder value maximization, hence the need for specific incentives in their direction.

Not only are these goals compensated (albeit modestly), we also find that companies that announce an environmental or social goal tend to score higher on measures produced by Sustainalytics, one of the leading sources of data on ESG performance. However, we find these improvements are largely on process measures (for example, they start programs to measure their environmental impact), but typically not on outcome measures (environmental fines continue to remain high).

Finally, we examine financial performance over the medium-long term (5-10 years). We find very little evidence that a focus on shareholder value is associated with higher (or lower) shareholder value, whether this is in the form of higher stock returns, a larger increase in dividends, or in profitability. A focus on shareholder value does, however, tend to be associated with lower asset and sales growth.

So what exactly do the stated objectives imply for what firms maximize? Few firms today emphasize only shareholder value maximization as an objective. We have three further possibilities. Firms do focus on shareholder value maximization (which inherently has a long-term focus if share prices accurately reflect outcomes over the long term) but emphasize interim objectives, including specific stakeholder interests, as an effective way to reach the ultimate goal. This sometimes is termed “doing well by doing good”. It may also be that goals that are different from shareholder value maximization may be pursued because management intends to maximize shareholder welfare, where shareholder welfare includes shareholder social objectives (Hart and Zingales, 2017 and 2022). We will call both “enlightened shareholderism.”

Another possibility is that the firm’s management simply has different preferences for ends other than maximizing shareholder value. For instance, it may want to give equal weight to all stakeholders (what Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) term “pluralistic stakeholderism”), or it may single out specific stakeholders that it values more than others – what we could term “specific stakeholderism”.

Finally, some firms’ management may emphasize alternative objectives as a form of cheap talk, intended to alleviate pressure from engaged constituencies by suggesting management understands their concerns. Relatedly, managers may espouse multiple objectives in order to avoid accountability for any single one. Such behavior could be termed “opportunistic goal setting”, a form of agency.

What does the evidence suggest? Most firms do not weigh all stakeholders equally. Instead, the evidence suggests that when they do emphasize specific stakeholders such as customers or employees, it is because doing so might contribute to longer-term firm value. Bolstering this view is the finding that firms compensate largely on shareholder value. We also do find that firms announce environmental and social goals, and compensate for them (albeit modestly). This may be because managers believe in these goals or

think shareholders do. The limited effect found on outcomes might, however, suggest that these goals are emphasized to give the firm the “license to operate”, and not because the firm intends to employ resources to achieve them. We do find a fair amount of evidence suggesting that managers state goals opportunistically to escape scrutiny or alleviate stakeholder pressures. All these then point to “enlightened shareholderism tinged with opportunism” as a description of managerial behavior. From a policy perspective, our work suggests that a reliance on corporate social responsibility alone to address societal challenges like climate change may be optimistic.

Turning to the literature, there are a number of papers in finance that use Natural Language Processing to study other issues. Hoberg and Phillips (2016) use it to determine the degree of competition in an industry, while Cohen et al. (2020) use it to predict stock returns. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper using NLP to identify corporate goals.

There is also a small literature looking at shareholder letters. Mooers (2020) conducts an informal analysis of all shareholder letters from Warren Buffett and Jeff Bezos and concludes “the shareholder letters of both men do a fantastic job of communicating the plans, goals, successes, and failures within their companies.” The closest paper to ours is Zaccone et al. (2021). They show that during the period 2011-2019, a CEO’s use of shareholder-value language in the shareholder letter decreases the likelihood that a firm is targeted by shareholder activists, while the use of stakeholder-value language increases that likelihood.

Finally, Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020, 2022) examine whether the signatories to the 2019 Business Round Table (BRT) statement (emphasizing the importance of stakeholders) changed anything significant subsequently in their addressing of corporate objectives. After examining a variety of corporate documents, the authors argue they did not.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, we discuss the sample, while in section 2, we describe the methodology we use to identify goals. In Section 3, we describe how goals evolve over time, while in section 4, we develop rationales for why managers might state goals. In section 5, we study the evidence for these rationales. In section 6, we examine whether CEOs “walk the talk” in their goals, and conclude in section 7.

1. The Sample

We examine the objectives that large companies in the United States state they are working for in the years since 1955, to understand why a company picks a specific objective, and what effect such a choice has. To this end, we need to identify both a homogenous sample of large U.S. companies over time and a set of comparable and accessible documents where companies state their objectives reliably.

1.1. Sample

For a homogenous sample, we rely on Giuliano et al. (2023), who collect data on the largest 120 non-financial companies by sales and the top 30 financial companies by assets between 1900 and 2020. We restrict our attention to the period 1955-2020 when their classification is entirely based on Fortune rankings. The list of companies in 1955 is based on the 1956 Fortune ranking and so on. Unlike Giuliano et al. (2023), however, we collect this information every year. The list of companies is available in Appendix 1.

If the list of companies was different every year, we would have 9,900 companies (=66 years x 150). In fact, we only have 519 companies because, on average, companies remain in the sample for 18 years. Of these, 37 are present for at least 50 years, and only 27 for 50 continuous years (see Appendix 1).

1.2. Shareholder letter

In the early 20th century, publicly traded companies started to release some information about their accounts voluntarily in annual reports. Initially, the annual report was composed of little more than a letter by the President/Chairman to the stockholders, a signed audit opinion, and a few pages of financial statements. For example, the 1911 annual report of DuPont, one of the more prestigious companies of the time, consisted of only 11 pages.

In 1926, the New York Stock Exchange began to encourage companies to issue periodic reports (Jacobson, 1988). As a result, more companies started to adopt this practice. Among the reforms enacted following the 1929 Crash, Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required companies above a certain size and with shareholders above a certain threshold number to file an annual report with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The precise form of disclosure, Form 10-K, was dictated by the SEC a few years later in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 17, Section 249.310. Importantly though, the 10-K differs in some respects from the glossy annual reports that companies distribute at shareholders' meetings. In particular, it does not require a letter to shareholders.

Nevertheless, the annual report grew as it incorporated some of the disclosures mandated by SEC regulations. From 11 pages, the DuPont annual report grew to 37 pages in 1937, 44 pages in 1947, and 48 pages in 1955. By the beginning of our sample in 1955, it was a well-established practice for U.S. companies to issue an annual report starting with a letter of the Chairman or the President. In fact, we could not identify any annual report without a shareholder letter until 1969.

In 1984, however, the SEC started a pilot electronic filing system called Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR). As of fall 1995, more than 92% of all public companies were filing with

EDGAR.² Companies file only the 10K with EDGAR, but not the glossy version of the annual report. Consequently, we do not rely on EDGAR filings but instead, look for electronic or microfiche versions of the glossy annual report. With the diffusion of electronic filings, however, the popularity of the glossy annual report has diminished. In some cases, the annual report became a 10K preceded by a letter to shareholders, in others, even the letter disappeared.

In short, with the emergence of electronic filings, the number of annual reports without an opening letter increased (see Figure 1), but remained limited to less than 10 out of 150. It is only with the advent of social media that this number increased substantially. When we asked one company, Apple, why it stopped producing a letter, the investor relations office replied that they stopped the practice in the interest of “saving time, money, and the environment”.

At the same time, corporate reporting has exploded in the last decade. For example, in 2011 Walmart had only an annual report. In 2012, it added a Global Responsibility Report, in 2013 a Diversity and Inclusion Report and a Workforce Diversity Report, and in 2014, it also added a Global Compliance Report. Finally, for the fiscal year 2020, Walmart differentiates between the Annual Report and the “enhanced digital” Annual Report. The Annual Report is just the 10K, while the “enhanced digital” Annual Report contains a letter from the President & CEO, followed by a letter from the Chairman.

1.3. Shareholder Letter: Details

As the “letter to the shareholder”, we only consider the letter presenting the annual report, not the one introducing the proxy statement.³ If there are multiple letters in the annual report, we collect the first one, which tends to be the one signed by the highest ranked officer. When annual report and proxy statement are bunched together, the distinction between the introductory letter to one or the other becomes subtle. For example, PayPal in 2020 combined the proxy statement and the annual report in one single file, with a letter introducing both. Since the proxy statement precedes the annual report, the Chairman / CEO letter technically precedes the proxy, not the annual report. When we compare this letter with the two distinct letters that in the previous year preceded the annual report and the proxy statement, we found that the 2020 letter was signed by the same person and was constructed in the same way as the 2019 letter preceding the annual report. Thus, we feel confident in classifying this letter as a letter to shareholders. Fortunately, ambiguous cases like these are few and limited to recent years.

² <https://help.edgar-online.com/edgar/history.asp?site=pro#:~:text=In%201984%2C%20the%20SEC%20allocated,get%20the%20information%20it%20needed.>

³ In recent years, even proxy statements (documents containing the information companies are required to provide to shareholders so they can make informed decisions about matters that will be brought up at an annual or special stockholder meeting) contain letters. When the letter exists, it typically tends to focus on the governance issues, not on corporate objectives and performance.

As Nickerson and de Groot (2005) describe, there is a typical format for the shareholder letter. After the salutation, it continues with some description of the macroeconomic situation and then quickly moves to corporate performance (financial and otherwise). Then, it speculates on future performance, providing future objectives and business strategies. Traditionally it ends by thanking the workforce and shareholders, followed by announcements about board changes. Our focus is on stated corporate objectives or goals.

1.4. Sample Details

The full sample would be 9,900 company years. As the last column in Table 1 shows, we lose 97 firm years because some large corporations, such as the food and agriculture company Cargill and the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (after they were taken over by the government from 2008 onward), are not publicly traded. For all the remaining company years, we search for the companies' annual reports in Mergent Archive, ProQuest, corporate web sites, and the University of Chicago Library. When we could not locate the annual report, we asked for inter library loans from Purdue University and Harvard University. At the end, we were able to collect readable text for 8,962 letters, equal to 96% of the accessible sample.

Using the historical names in Fortune and the level of sales (assets) reported in Fortune, we match this sample with Compustat. We require companies to have the same name and have sales (assets) within 5% of the level reported on Fortune. We are able to identify 8,410 company years. The main reason why some companies may remain unmatched after this procedure is because Compustat is very sparse in the period 1955 to 1968.

2. Methodology

We now turn to how we determine corporate goals from the letters.

2.1 The Challenge

Shareholder letters often contain clear statements of goals. For example, a sentence in Monsanto Chemical's letter in 1958 reads, "Management's prime objective has been, and is, to better the return on the company's invested capital." Yet, not all goal sentences are so clear-cut. For example, in 1979, Ralston Purina's CEO writes: "Our Company continues to address social challenges with special emphasis in communities where we conduct our operations. By assisting traditional nonprofit organizations as well as smaller, newer groups, we have maintained our voluntary commitment to help those in need become stronger economically, educationally, medically, and culturally. While our activity cannot by itself solve all problems, we believe our efforts represent the sort of voluntary action which American business must

pursue. We pledge to contribute toward that goal because its attainment is in the best interest of the nation and the Company.”

Since we have nearly 9,000 letters, it would be very time-consuming to read them all to extract the goal sentences. Furthermore, this process would be subject to a high degree of arbitrariness. Thus, we have to use some form of Natural Language Processing. To analyze shareholder letters with any NLP technique, first, we have to break up the letter into manageable portions. Goals are often discussed throughout a paragraph (as in the Ralston Purina statement above); thus, we would lose valuable information if we broke the letter into constituent sentences without noting the link between sentences. We, therefore, divide the collected shareholder letters into paragraphs, where the end of a paragraph is demarcated by the presence of a period, exclamation mark, or question mark, followed by a new line. We count on average 25 paragraphs per letter (see Figure 2).

NLP techniques generally require large amounts of labeled data for training. Unfortunately, we do not have any pre-labeled data on what constitutes a goal, and the process of labeling sentences is time-consuming. Thus, we need a technique that works well even with a limited quantum of labeled data. Devlin et al. (2018) developed a versatile deep-learning model for various NLP tasks called BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers). This model can first be conveniently pre-trained on a large corpus of English language text that allows it to incorporate the structure of language, then further trained on the business language in shareholder letters, and finally calibrated on task-specific labeled data (e.g., paragraphs classified as containing or not containing a goal).

Sun et al. (2019) contain a simple description of this technique. First, BERT is trained using BookCorpus, a dataset consisting of 11,038 unpublished books from 16 different genres and 2,500 million words from text passages of English Wikipedia. Fortunately, this very computationally expensive task has already been done by Google. We thus start with the BERT-Base uncased model with 12 layers and 110M parameters. We further pre-train BERT on the corpus of all shareholder letters: this procedure involves masking 15% of the words in a sentence and training a BERT language model to predict the masked words. This step is termed the In-Task further Pre-Training (ITPT-BERT) step.

2.2. Labeling Goal Sentences

The next step requires fine-tuning the ITPT-BERT model on labeled paragraphs for it to discern goal paragraphs from no-goal paragraphs. Then within the set of goal paragraphs, we further have to train the classifier to distinguish between various goals. Finally, we have to assess the accuracy of the classifier. Here are the steps in more detail. The impatient reader can skip this and the next subsection.

The classifier should distinguish paragraphs containing goals from paragraphs that do not. For that, we need a training sample. Thus, we randomly sample 3000 paragraphs (46 for each year up to 2019) that

contain at least one word likely to indicate the presence of a goal in the paragraph. These keywords are: 'aim', 'anticipate', 'expect', 'forecast', 'forward', 'intend', 'likely', 'ought', 'plan', 'predict', 'project', 'seek', 'ought', 'outlook', 'target', 'future', 'forthcoming', 'hope', 'ahead', 'optimistic', 'opportunity', 'mission', 'vision', 'strategy', 'goal', 'objective', 'expansion', 'develop', 'development', 'commit', 'purpose', 'milestone', 'core'. The classifier also needs to see paragraphs that have nothing to do with the corporation's objectives. For this reason, we randomly sample 1500 paragraphs, 23 for each fiscal year, from the subsample that does not contain any of the words mentioned above.

The three authors independently read and classified each of the 4,500 paragraphs as to whether they contained goal sentences. Then, we met and ironed out the differences to reach a consensus. A paragraph is labeled as a goal paragraph if it contains a sentence, or sentences, explicitly stating a corporation's goal. These paragraphs generally contain an expression of intent toward an objective, like "we strive to achieve ...", "we must work to improve ...", "Unwavering commitment to ...", "This planning is aimed towards ...".

We debated what to do with paragraphs celebrating results, such as "the company achieved record highs in ...". Such paragraphs implicitly indicate what enters positively into the firm's utility function. Nevertheless, we decided not to include such paragraphs as goal paragraphs; at some level, management must think anything that makes it into the shareholder letter is worth emphasizing, so we need to insist on more precise statements of intent rather than deduce them implicitly. Other paragraphs labeled "non-goal" include paragraphs describing the business, the results, the board, or the macroeconomic situation.

At the end of the letter, it is common for the CEO to thank employees, shareholders, customers, and other stakeholders. We adopt the convention that if the sentence simply praises employees' contribution to the company business, we mark the paragraph as a non-goal. Conversely, if the sentence indicates that the company intends to benefit the stakeholder – for example, by actively investing in training and developing the employees -- we label it a goal paragraph.

To fine-tune the model, the input (the labeled paragraphs) are processed by the ITPT-BERT model to produce a contextual vectorization that is then fed to a Feed Forward Neural Net (the classification head).⁴ Then for each unclassified paragraph, the classifier outputs a 2-dimensional numerical vector, which we can interpret as the probability that the paragraph fits into one of the two categories: goal or non-goal.⁵

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⁴ To prevent the model from learning spurious patterns between company names or time indicators and labels, we anonymize the text before feeding it to the model. We substitute the company name with the token "ORG", personal names with the word "PERSON", and time indicators with the token "DATE."

⁵ We train the classifier with the k-fold technique popular in machine learning. We split the labeled dataset into five sets or folds and use four for training and one for validation. We alternate the validation fold and average the validation metrics over the five iterations.

⁶ At this stage in our analysis, we had employed for the goal/non-goal classification a different binary text classifier: ULMFiT. Similar to BERT, ULMFiT relies on the same idea of training a language model on a vast corpus of

2.3. Labeling the Types of Goal

Our analysis of the 4,500 paragraphs suggested four broad categories of goals, for a total of 13 goals. First, any form of maximizing residual value such as maximizing profits, return on investment, reducing costs, or, more generally, running the company in shareholders' interest, which we term "Shareholder Value [Maximization] Broad". Second, enhancing other measures of corporate performance that benefit the entire company, though not necessarily the shareholders, in particular Market Share Growth (including sales growth), Innovation (and product development), and Risk Management (including debt reduction). Third, running the company for the benefit of other corporate stakeholders: Customer, Employee, Supplier, Community, and, generically, Stakeholders. Finally, focusing on larger societal responsibilities such as emphasizing Ethics; Philanthropy; the environment, including emissions and pollution (ESG Environment); and social goals (ESG Social), which include diversity and inclusion.

For each of these 13 goals, we collected a set of seed words (e.g., for employees we used "people", "team", "talent", "partner", "associate"...) that broadly represent that goal. We also looked for synonyms of these seed words so that we would have a comprehensive set of seed words. Then among the paragraphs that the binary classifier predicted to be goals, we extracted the most frequent trigrams (three consecutive words) that contained at least one of the seed words. We manually checked all the trigrams that represented at least 0.001% of the most frequent trigrams used and determined trigrams that expressed a legitimate goal such as "increase shareholder value" while discarding those that did not, such as "consistently high profits." We then selected 100 paragraphs with the highest probability to be goal paragraphs containing any of the trigrams for that goal. For our goal category "Supplier", we identified only 30 candidate paragraphs, reflecting the paucity of supplier related goals. The collection of candidate paragraphs from the other twelve goals yielded 50 duplicates. We read the resulting 1,180 candidate paragraphs and manually classified them into the 13 goal categories. Doing so, we ended up with a second labeled dataset that assigned each goal paragraph into one or more of 13 goals.

2.4 Training the Multi-Goal Classifier: BERT 2

Finally, we implement a strategy similar to the one used for the binary classification, this time employing a multi-class multi-label classification head. We import the BERT model parameters from the binary Bert model for classification, and randomly initialize a multi-class multi-label head. This model should retain familiarity with the classification goal/non-goal and further learn about the specific goals espoused.

unstructured data through masked words prediction. Afterwards, the core of the language model is maintained, and the language model head is substituted with an architecture that better fits classification. As BERT became the widely recognized state of the art text classifier, we substituted it for ULMFiT.

Taking a paragraph as input, the model will return an output of dimension 1×13 , where each entry takes a value in $\{0,1\}$. It simultaneously predicts which of the 13 goals is recognized in the input paragraph. The *precision* of the classifier is the percentage of correctly predicted, that is, as labeled, paragraphs out of the total paragraphs. The *recall* is the number of paragraphs correctly predicted as goal-paragraphs relative to the total true goal-paragraphs. The multi-class multi-label classifier records an average precision (among the 13 goals) of 85% and an average recall of 81%.⁷

To identify corporate objectives, we run both classifiers (binary and multi-class multi-label) in sequence on every paragraph from the corpus of shareholders' letters. We first classify a paragraph as a goal paragraph or not with the binary classifier, and second, we use the multi-label classifier to identify any of the 13 goal categories we are interested in tracking.⁸ Our final step is to condense the sample back to the company-year level. We create an indicator for each goal and every year that takes value one if the shareholder letter that year contains at least one paragraph containing that goal according to the compound classifier.

3. Evolution of Corporate Objectives Over Time

In this section, we study the changes in the objectives of the largest American corporations over the last 65 years. Through this lens, we can capture the changes in the perceived challenges companies face.

The first change is in who signs the letter, which also reflects the command structure in American enterprises. As Giuliano et al. (2023) document, in 1960 63% of the firms had a chairman who did not hold any other position, 19% had a chairman who was also the CEO or president, and 28% had an executive called CEO. By 1980 the CEO was dominant -- present in 80% of firms. Also, 78% of CEOs were also chairmen. In 2020, 99% of the firm had a CEO, and 51% of these individuals were also the chairman. Only 42% had a chairman who did not hold any other position.

Given these changes in the structure of the executive suites, who signs the letter? We are especially interested in capturing whether the person signing the letter is involved with day-to-day management, or only the chairperson of the board, mostly focused on governance. The number of people signing the letter has changed over time. As Table 2 shows, in 1960, on average 1.6 people signed the letter, down to 1.1 in 2020. Throughout the period it looks like the letter is always (between 94% and 100% of the time) signed

⁷ Similar to the binary classification exercise, we anonymize the text before feeding it to the multi-class multi-label classifier. We are interested in a high F-score, the harmonic mean of binary classifier's precision and recall values. We deal again with a small dataset, so we implement once more the techniques suggested in Zhang et al. (2021) and Sun et al. (2019), we train the classifier with the five-fold method and search for the hyperparameters that maximize the F-scores averaged across objectives.

⁸ Some of the paragraphs classified as goal paragraphs by the binary classifier are filtered out by the multi-label classifier if it cannot classify the paragraph into any of the 13 objectives. This improves the quality of the classification.

by an executive officer, be they the CEO or the President. In addition, in the early years, when the Chairman was a separate person, the letter was often signed by the Chairman (61% of the time in 1960). In later years, the CEO, who is often also Chairman, tends to sign alone.

During the same time period, we observe a change in the content of the letters. As Figure 3 Panel A indicates, in 1955, only 33% of the letters contained at least one goal, by 1990, 93% of the letters have multiple goals. This percentage underestimates the change in the contents of letters.

Conditional on having a goal, shareholder letters had an average of two goals in 1955 and seven in 2020 (Figure 3 Panel B). In Figure 4 Panel A, we plot the share of goal paragraphs in a letter. As expected, the multi-goal classifier is a little more stringent than the binary classifier, but both show the percentage of paragraphs containing at least one goal increasing. For the multi-goal classifier, which is what we use in what follows, the fraction of goal paragraphs increased from less than 5% to more than 40%. This trend is not because BERT cannot capture goals in the early years, since we see the same trend in the paragraphs we classified manually (Figure 4 Panel B).⁹

Figure 3 A and B suggest the increase in the share of goal paragraphs observed in Figure 4 Panel A is due to a simultaneous increase in both margins: more firms state at least one goal, and each firm stating at least one goal states more of them. The three most important goals in 1955 were Shareholder Value Broad, Market Share Growth, and Customer. By 2020, most goals (except Supplier) are more evenly represented. Consider an example of the proliferation of corporate objectives by the end of the sample: In 2017, International Paper stated (and we summarize here)

- We will continue to lead the world in responsible forest stewardship to ensure healthy and productive forest ecosystems for generations to come.
- We make sustainable investments to protect and improve the lives of our employees
- We mobilize our people, products and resources to address critical needs in the communities where our employees live and work.
- We work continuously to reduce our global manufacturing emissions.
- We create innovative, sustainable and recyclable products that help our customers achieve their objectives.
- We deliver long-term value for all stakeholders by establishing advantaged positions in attractive market segments with safe, efficient manufacturing operations near sustainable fiber sources.

⁹ The levels are different in Figure 4 Panels A and B because we deliberately altered the fraction of paragraphs likely to be goal and non-goal in the latter.

- We delivered cost-of-capital returns for the eighth consecutive year and generated \$2 billion in free cash flow, which enabled us to reduce debt, further de-risk our pension plan...
- Overall, International Paper is well-positioned to create value for our shareowners and other stakeholders

3.1 Shareholder value

Let us now turn to the goal that has been most debated: maximizing profitability or shareholder value. In Figure 5 Panel A, we plot the percentage of firms that mention Shareholder Value Broad as a goal in the shareholder letter, conditional on stating at least one goal (recall this implies any goal suggestive of enhancing shareholder residual value, such as increasing profits, reducing costs, increasing dividends, enhancing the return on capital, etc.).

In 1955, 42% of the companies that mentioned a goal mentioned Shareholder Value Broad. Given that 33% of the firms stated at least one goal, around 14% of the firms declared that they wanted to maximize shareholder value, broadly speaking. By 1970, 53% of firms mentioned at least a goal, with 52% of those mentioning some form of shareholder value, for a total of 28%. By 1990, nearly 100% of the firms expressed at least a goal, with 89% of those mentioning some form of shareholder value, for an average across all firms of 89%. Again, the increase occurs on both margins.

Shareholder Value Broad does capture the academic and practical sense of the term shareholder value maximization. Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, finance academics first, and practitioners later, emphasized the notion that share prices captured the full benefits occurring to shareholders over time. Heilbron et al. (2014) find that the first use of the term ‘shareholder value’ in the Wall Street Journal was in 1965 and that the phrase was used sparingly before 1983. Taylor (2015) finds that the first use of the term ‘shareholder value’ in the ProQuest database of annual reports is in 1965, but he finds a sharp increase in usage beginning in 1983. Thus, in the early 1980s, maximization of shareholder value (sometimes with the qualification “long-term”) became the new mantra. For this reason, we create a second narrower definition of the shareholder objective; within the goal paragraphs that we classified as “Shareholder Value Broad” we look for paragraphs containing ‘shareholder value’ (or ‘stockholder value’, ‘share owner value’, ‘stock owner value’). This then becomes our “Shareholder Value Narrow” objective focused on shareholder value.

As Figure 5 Panel A shows, hardly any firms use the term before 1980. By the late 1990s, around half of the firms that state a goal (which includes nearly all firms by then) have Shareholder Value Narrow as a goal. The peak (59%) seems to be in 1997 when the Business Roundtable declared this was the main objective of corporations. At the beginning of the new millennium, the percentage of firms with a

shareholder value goal drops and hovers around 50% till the late 2010s. In the last few years, it has dropped significantly.

Thus, no matter what definition we adopt, we can see a surge in firms stating shareholder value maximization or versions thereof as an objective between 1980 and the end of the century. It is also important to stress that attention to the bottom line has grown steadily since 1955 as firms paid more attention to objectives. Interestingly, the publication of Milton Friedman's article in 1970 does not seem to have impacted the trend, at least not right away.

3.2. Frequency of Other Goals

In Figure 5 Panel B, we plot the percentage of firms that mention one of the three big categories of goals other than shareholder value maximization: "Corporate performance" (which includes Market Share Growth, Innovation, and Risk Management), "Other stakeholders" (which includes Customer, Employee, Supplier, Community, and generically, Stakeholders), and "Society as a whole" (which includes ESG Social, ESG Environment, Philanthropy, and Ethics¹⁰). These percentages are calculated as a fraction of the number of firms expressing at least one goal that year. In the 1950s, 42% of the firms expressed a corporate performance goal (conditional on expressing a goal). By the 1990s, all of them do. At the beginning of the sample, almost 70% of the firms that state a goal express a stakeholder goal. This percentage remains roughly constant till the 1980s, approaching 100% by the end of the 1990s. This pattern seems inconsistent with the idea that the so-called shareholder revolution of the 1980s led to a single-minded devotion to shareholder value. Finally, the percentage of firms that proclaim broader social goals is roughly 10% in the early 1960s, rises to 40% by the late 1960s, then drops again to 10% in the early 1980s. After that, there was a jump in the late 1980s, a jump in the early 2000s, and then a jump after 2015, to above 90% in 2020.

Figure 5 Panel C decomposes the three performance goals. The market share/growth goal rises steadily from around 20 percent in 1955 to over 80 percent in the early 2000s of firms announcing at least one goal.¹¹ Surprisingly, innovation as a goal was fairly rare until the 1980s (about 20%). Even today it is stated by less than half the firms. Risk management was non-existent as a goal until the mid-1970s. Then, it had a steady rise (perhaps with the rise in corporate leverage), with peaks around recession and crisis.

Figure 5 Panel D decomposes the five stakeholder goals. Suppliers are rarely considered a constituency worth benefiting, nor are Stakeholders as a specific category prominent, except in the last ten years. The "Community" started to be relevant as a stakeholder in the early 2000s and from there on it went

¹⁰ One could debate whether "ethics" should be a corporate performance goal, or a societal goal. We classified it in the latter (in part because enunciation of the objective seems to follow corporate scams that raise societal awareness), though we understand the classification could be debated.

¹¹ In the 1960s, the term "market share" was forbidden inside IBM for fear of antitrust suits. Arguably, the rise of market share as a goal might be the reflection of a weakening of antitrust enforcement during the same period (Lancieri et al., 2022).

from being mentioned in less than 20% of the letters to being mentioned in close to 80% of the letters. Employee and Customer are the remaining categories of stakeholders. Both these groups experienced an increase in importance in the 1980s: Employee went from being mentioned in 20 percent to 70 percent of letters, while Customer from 40 percent to over 80 percent.

Figure 5 Panel E decomposes the four societal goals. Until 2000, these goals were infrequent. Both ESG Social and ESG Environment had a temporary rise in the mid-60s to early 1970s (perhaps because of the civil rights movement for the former and the attention to pollution stemming from acid rain, smog, and, later, Love Canal for the latter). ESG Environment rose again in the late 1980s. But then it quickly returned to its baseline level. After 2000, all the societal goals rose, with ESG Social and ESG Environment skyrocketing in the last few years. In 2020, approximately 70% of the firms mention an ESG Social goal and an ESG Environment goal, while in the mid-1980s, around 10% did. Finally, statements about a firm's ethics jump in the early 2000s, something we will return to later.

The waxing and waning of ethics/environmental/social objectives (as also the earlier risk management objective) suggests that firms do not necessarily adhere permanently to an objective after declaring it. Some objectives have a time and place in the firm's agenda. We will return to this when we discuss the rationales for stating objectives.

One interesting question is whether the observed changes are driven by existing companies adding (or removing) goals or by new entrants that pursue different goals. We answer this question in Figure 6. We compute how many of the companies belonging to the top 150 in year $t-1$, and continuing into the next year in the top 150, add or drop an objective in year t . We present the annual average net change by decade (blue bar). We also compute the net change for the firms entering/leaving the sample as the difference between the year t goals for companies added to the top 150 in year t and the goals for companies dropped from the sample in year t . Once again, we present the average annual net change by decade (orange bar). Figure 6 Panel A reports this statistic for the Shareholder Value (Narrow) goal. From the 1970s to the 2000s, existing companies add Shareholder Value (Narrow) as a goal: first at a slow pace (less than half per year), then at a faster pace, between 2 and 3 per year in the next three decades. Until the 1990s, the newly added companies seem to follow the same trend, although the bulk of the change takes place in the existing companies. Interestingly, in the 2010s, existing companies tend to drop Shareholder Value (Narrow) as a goal, at a pace of 3.5 per year.

For ESG Social and ESG Environment, the change in goals is again dominated by existing companies (Figures 6 Panel B and Panel C), but the trend is very different from that for Shareholder Value (Narrow). Both social and environmental goals increase in the 1960s, drop in the 1970s, and explode in the 2010s. Between 1980 and 2010, the social and environmental goals behave differently. Firms espouse ESG Environment in the 1980s. They become less eager to embrace the environment in the 1990s, but become

enthusiastic again in the 2000s, perhaps as awareness about climate change spreads. By contrast, corporations embrace ESG Social tepidly between 1980 and 2010.

3.3. Correlation between Goals

Thus far, we have only analyzed the presence of each goal individually. More can be learned about the way CEOs see the world by comparing which goals they want to pursue as a group at different times. In Figure 7 we present the correlation between various goals at different points in time. Figure 7 Panel A presents the correlation matrix in the period 1955-1959. There is a strong correlation between Shareholder Value (Broad), Market Share Growth, Employee, and Customer. Innovation is strongly positively correlated with Market Share Growth, but less so with other goals. All these goals, broadly speaking, relate to measures of performance. This was a period of high growth, where CEOs were delivering performance, and perhaps felt no need to genuflect to anyone other than key stakeholders.

In Figure 7 Panel B, we present the correlation matrix of goals twenty years later (1975-79). The strong correlation between Shareholder Value, Market Share Growth, Employee, and Customer remains, but the Innovation goal is more firmly in the block. At the same time, we observe the emergence of another block consisting of societal goals such as Community, ESG Social, ESG Environment, Ethics, and Philanthropy (Community and Philanthropy are particularly strongly correlated from this period on). The protests of the late 60s and early 70s seem to have raised concerns about society, civil rights, and the environment. Some companies seem to have responded, although these are not the companies that emphasize shareholder value maximization or other performance goals. The only goal that is commonly emphasized by both the performance-oriented and societal-oriented blocks of companies seems to be employees.

In 1995-1999, the correlation structure between the variables in the performance block becomes weaker (Figure 7 Panel C), especially the one between Shareholder Value and Innovation. The societal block (represented by Employee, Community, ESG Environment, ESG Social, Ethics, and Philanthropy) remains highly correlated, except for Ethics. These are the years of the dot.com boom, where ethics is not mentioned very frequently.

Finally, in 2015-2019, while the correlations in the performance block, especially with Shareholder Value, weaken somewhat (Figure 7 Panel D), Customer and Employee goals remain highly correlated. The correlation among the variables in the societal block (Employee, Community, ESG Environment, ESG Social, and Philanthropy) strengthens considerably.

In sum, by combining the evidence on the frequency of the various goals with the evidence on correlations, we can conclude the following: Throughout all the periods, shareholder value is highly correlated with growth. ESG goals emerged as a consistent theme during the 1970s. Until very recently, however, they were a concern of a minority of companies, and now they have become the norm. Finally,

companies that focus on performance goals and companies that focus on societal goals seem to be distinct groups, as the weak correlations in the first and third quadrants over the years suggest.

4. What drives management to state objectives in shareholder letters?

4.1 The Audience

Who is the audience for shareholder letters? One answer comes from the initial salutation. In 1955, 70% of the letters start with a salutation, “Dear shareholder (stockholders, shareowners)”. However, 22% start with a salutation to the Board, and 8% of the letters start with a salutation that also includes employees and/or customers. Thus, it is clear that these are important audiences as well. When we repeat the exercise in 2020, the results are very similar: 73% of the letters start with a salutation to shareholders, 19% to the Board, and 5% to employees and customers, suggesting the addressed audience is similar.

Yet, as Sikes (1986) claims: “The audience for annual reports extends beyond stockholders and employees. Executives use them as calling cards, salesmen as credentials, personnel departments as recruiting tools, and financial analysts as a means of evaluating a company's performance.”

Before the Internet and the emergence of new channels of direct communication with the public, the release of a company's annual report was a noteworthy event that would catch press attention. Even after the advent of the Internet, the shareholder letter is likely to be a way for the firm to communicate its official thought-through position via a vehicle that still gets attention, though the rise in the number of reports without letters since the early 2000s (Figure 1) may also partly be because firms have alternative ways of communicating through the Internet with their audiences.

What Sikes says for annual reports (also see Hyland (1998)) applies a fortiori to the shareholder letter, which comes at the beginning of the annual report and is unencumbered by regulatory requirements. Thus, we concur with Lee's (1994) view that “corporate executives use annual reports as part of an image management function to influence external stakeholders”, where, in addition to those traditionally thought of as external stakeholders, we also include the government, regulators, and society at large. Small companies are unlikely to be of much interest to the press. They are likely to communicate through their annual reports primarily with investors, in which case we should see them focus on issues of direct concern to investors such as corporate performance. Large companies are likely to attract more press and societal attention. For example, Tallarita (2021) shows that the vast majority of shareholder proposals are concentrated in a few large, highly visible, companies. With their broader audience, we expect that larger and more visible companies would feel more compelled to be sensitive to public concerns, especially ones that are not connected to financial performance, than smaller companies.

4.2. Are Stated Objectives Credible?

Fisch and Solomon (2021) argue that corporate purpose is “a means that allows corporate participants to signal, monitor, and manage their expectancy interests. Purpose identifies the metrics by which managers are to be held accountable. Purpose also informs stakeholders as to the degree to which they must seek alternative mechanisms to protect their claims through contract or regulation.” Yet, is the signal conveyed by the stated purpose credible, or is it simply cheap talk?

The shareholder letter is not part of the disclosures mandated by the SEC. Whether shareholders can sue a company for a statement made in a document that is not part of the required reporting is still an open question. In 2010 Goldman Sachs was sued for misrepresentation because its business principles (“our clients’ interests always come first”) stated on its websites were at odds with its business practices (the Abacus deal it was accused of mis-selling). Over ten years later, the matter is still being litigated.¹²

Even if the statements contained in shareholder letters are not legally binding, however, it does not mean they do not matter. As Farrell and Gibbons (1989) show, an informed sender can affect the beliefs of two interested but uninformed receivers through cheap talk because the presence of one audience can discipline the sender's relationship with the other.

For example, when the CEO of Freeport-Memoran Copper & Gold writes “The safety of our workforce is our highest priority. Our programs are designed to achieve a safe environment for all our workers,” the workers read the statement and can easily embarrass him if it is not true, or use the statement against him in the next labor negotiation. Similarly, corporate purpose statements are used by corporate social activists to promote their causes. For example, in 2021 the CEO of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) stated “Our purpose is to unlock the power of nature to enrich the quality of life. And we cannot achieve that purpose without a strong and unrelenting focus on protecting our planet, our communities and our people.”¹³ This goal seems at odds with ADM’s lack of disclosure of pesticides in its supply chain. A shareholder advocate, *As You Sow*, emphasized this contradiction in filing a shareholder proposal requesting disclosure (the resolution obtained 34% of the votes in 2022).¹⁴

The multiplicity of audiences should also enhance the cost of adding goals. Not only will audiences monitor, and embarrass the company if it does not follow stated goals, but also the pursuit of some goals (like a cleaner environment) can be at odds with the pursuit of others (like profit maximization). Perhaps this is why we see the emergence of distinct blocks of stated goals in Figure 7.

4.3. *Who is most in the limelight?*

¹² Matthew C. Turk, 2022, “The securities fraud class action after Goldman Sachs,” *American Business Law Journal*, Volume 59, Issue 2, 281–338, Summer 2022.

¹³ https://www.adm.com/globalassets/sustainability/sustainability-reports/pdfs/4019111_11_archer-daniels-midland_esg_clean-compressed.pdf.

¹⁴ <https://www.asyousow.org/resolutions/2021/11/22-archer-daniels-midland-pesticide-use-in-agricultural-supply-chain>

The incentive to state goals so as to influence audiences should be greater the more likely a firm is of interest to the broader public. In part, this is determined by sheer size. Walmart gets more attention than Chuck E. Cheese. Yet, given their size, some companies are intrinsically more newsworthy than others. For example, Disney is more newsworthy than Cargill, perhaps because Disney interacts more directly with consumers and has iconic status in their eyes, even if Cargill has five times the revenues of Disney. Thus, we expect CEOs of larger companies and companies generating more news items to be more inclined to cater to societal-wide goals in their letters. As society obtains more information from a greater variety of sources, this scrutiny may also have changed over time.

4.4. Why Firms Might Differ in their Objectives

If objectives are stated to persuade audiences of management's intent, why do different firms state different objectives? We see three broad reasons for why firms state objectives. A firm's management may respond to the changed power and preference of its key audiences. It may also announce objectives to commit to improve firm-specific situations, or to cater to specific stakeholders. Finally, managerial opportunism may also drive objectives, including the desire to deflect attention from underperformance or to herd with others.

It will be hard for us to divine managerial intent precisely from the data. However, we will examine the following: (1) Do changes in corporate constituencies or corporate/societal circumstances presage changes in objectives? (2) In the cross-section of firms, which firms announce which specific objectives and under what circumstances? (3) Do firms that announce objectives change behaviors to suggest they intend to achieve objectives? (4) Does any of this have measurable effects on outcomes?

4.5. Why Firms Pick Specific Objective over Time

4.5.1. Changes in Audience Power

In 1950, more than 90% of U.S. equity was owned directly by households. By 2007, this figure had dropped to less than 30% (Zingales, 2009). At the same time, institutional ownership went from less than 40% in 1980 to around 75% by 2020 (see Figure 8). Greater ownership concentration reduces per-share shareholder costs of monitoring the firm. It also increases their ability to coordinate, and thus exerts greater pressure on management. We expect increases in institutional ownership to be followed by increased attention of management to the interest of shareholders.

Another factor that increased the power of shareholders during the 1980s was hostile takeovers. In 1980, only 28 S&P500 stocks were the target of a takeover bid, by 1988 the number had risen to 98, and more than half of these bids were openly hostile. By the year 2000, the number of takeover bids had dropped

to 43, and hostile takeovers had almost disappeared. The fear of a takeover, especially of a hostile takeover, forces managers to pay closer attention to the interest of shareholders. Thus, we expect takeover pressure to be positively correlated to shareholder value objectives.

The power of other stakeholders changed as well, perhaps more indirectly. For instance, between the 1970s and the 1980s, the increase in the penetration of foreign imports into the US, famously in the automobile sector, may have forced US firms to become more customer friendly.

4.5.2. Changes in Audience Preferences

Even when Friedman (1970) exhorted managers to “make as much money as possible”, he added, “while conforming to their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.” Thus, firms are embedded in society and often feel the need to articulate a larger purpose than offering a product that people want – firms also want to conform to the norms of the society they live in. For example, in 2006, Microsoft stated that its “defining mission is to help people and businesses realize their full potential”, while in 2021, P&G defined its purpose as: “We will provide branded products and services of superior quality and value that improve the lives of the world’s consumers, now and for generations to come.” The constituencies the firm interacts with may have preferences on the environment or on diversity and inclusion that go beyond what is mandated by the law. A firm that deviates from those preferences may risk being seen as violating its implicit license to practice (see the letter from Larry Fink, CEO of fund powerhouse Blackrock, to corporate CEOs in 2017).

In this regard, shareholder interests do not necessarily imply just the maximization of shareholder value. To the extent investors care about more than just monetary returns, firms would want to maximize their welfare (Hart and Zingales, 2017 and 2022), which might include concerns about the environment and society at large, not just their financial return. In the 2010s, the pressure on institutional investors to consider other objectives mounted.

A particularly important factor was the declaration of the Principles for Responsible Investments (PRI). In 2005, Kofi Annan, then United Nations Secretary General, gathered a 20-person committee to develop the Principles for Responsible Investment. The committee developed six principles that commit signatories to incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and their policies and practices as owners.¹⁵ Regardless of whether these principles are in the interest of the ultimate investors, they represent what institutional investors want. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect that the widespread adoption of PRI principles by investors, in turn, pressured firms to increase their ESG goals.

Similarly, the attention society pays to certain issues, as well as society’s preferences, change over time based on societal developments or important trigger events. Calls for diversity and inclusion increased

¹⁵ <https://www.unpri.org/about-us/what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment>

in the 1960s with the civil rights movement. Companies were quick to respond. For example, American Home Products Chairman, William F. Laporte, explained in his letter to shareholders in 1970: “We continued to take positive action in providing increased employment opportunities for minority groups, in raising the education levels of employees and in other vital areas of social concern. Our affirmative action plans and programs have been reviewed and approved by appropriate governmental agencies...” However, attention to diversity subsequently waned as the public’s attention shifted.

Calls for diversity and inclusion have increased once again recently, after the heightened attention to issues of racial disparity, especially after the tragic murder of George Floyd in 2020. Apart from direct statements about enhancing diversity and inclusion, some CEOs signaled their desire to do better in other ways. For instance, the IBM CEO said “Being a responsible steward of technology is core to IBM culture and has never been more important than it was in 2020”, and followed by announcing in his shareholder letter that IBM would “abandon facial recognition software”. Other companies followed.

Another trigger event that draws public attention is fraud in large firms. It shouldn’t be surprising to see renewed statements about ethics after the Enron accounting fraud. “Maintaining uncompromisingly high ethical standards has always been a hallmark of Caterpillar,” writes its CEO in 2004.

Environmental sustainability has also increased recently as a public concern. Hence, Pepsico stated in 2009, “We are committed to protecting the Earth's natural resources and are well on our way to meeting our public goals for meaningful reductions in water, electricity, and fuel usage... Our climate change focus is on reducing our carbon footprint, including a reduction in absolute greenhouse gas emissions through continued improvement in energy efficiency and the use of alternative energy sources. We actively work with our farmers to promote sustainable agriculture and we are developing new packaging alternatives in both snacks and beverages to reduce our impact on the environment”.

4.5.3. Commitments to improve firm-specific situations

Very often, some company-specific adverse events, like a sharp drop in profitability, an excessive increase in leverage, an industrial accident, a lawsuit or regulatory penalty, or a product recall will put pressure on management to do better. One way to emphasize the commitment to do better is to set an objective – for instance, to emphasize the firm’s concern for the environment and to set lofty environmental goals after the firm has been fined by the EPA for violations, or to emphasize the importance of risk management and reducing debt if the firm is highly levered.

Social and environmental goals are often announced in response to lawsuits. For example, Coca Cola in 2000 writes “And while we worked to put behind us a difficult discrimination lawsuit, we resolved that we will strive to create the world's most diverse workforce.”

4.5.4. Commitments to specific constituencies

Firms may want to (1) identify certain constituencies they may favor; (2) They may emphasize what they perceive as the firm's key capabilities and thereby signal where they might devote resources;

Some objectives, like cutting costs or increasing workers' safety, tend to favor one stakeholder, sometimes at the expense of another. Favoring such a stakeholder may be an end in itself. It could also be a means to shareholder value maximization. To the extent that specific stakeholders are critical to firm performance, a clear commitment towards them through stated objectives verified by the firm's actual choices could enable it to build a reputation for favoring those stakeholders. In turn, the stakeholders would want to favor the firm, perhaps by displaying more loyalty or demanding lower compensation.

Some objectives may appeal to a variety of stakeholders, and may simply be intended to increase engagement by all with the firm. So, for instance, a firm that emphasizes product development and innovation as an objective is signaling to customers that it will continue producing high-quality products, to employees that it will be engaged in cutting-edge product development and R&D, and to shareholders that it will continue investing in a capability that is the source of its superior performance. Hence, 3M stated in 2003, "Our 3M Acceleration initiative is a pure growth initiative. Our objective is to improve what 3 M does best - innovation and new product development. Our goal is to double the number of qualified new 3M product ideas and triple the value of products that win in the marketplace ..." We would expect firms that spend more on R&D, or patent more, to present innovation as an objective.

Such signaling could also set expectations for the disfavored, allowing them to avoid the firm or seek contractual protections. For instance, top-notch finance specialists may avoid firms emphasizing product development, knowing that their financial engineering skills will not be called upon given the high potential costs of financial distress.

4.5.5. Managerial opportunism including herd behavior

Managers may state goals so as to deflect the attention of, or alleviate pressure from, key audiences. Indeed, many of the rationales for stating goals described above may apply, without management having any intention of changing behavior.

Also, CEOs do not state objectives in isolation. One of their most important audiences may be each other. They meet at Davos, sit on each other's boards, and participate in industry associations, like the Business Roundtable (BRT). Since deviating from the collective norm can carry a big social cost, some of the stated objectives of companies may be driven by the need to conform to other firms that espouse such objectives – this simply suggests that if for reasons detailed earlier, a sufficient mass of CEOs is pushed toward some objective(s), they may reach a tipping point where many more of them are impelled toward the objective(s).

This herd behavior generates a standard Manski (1993) reflection problem, which makes it difficult to identify the peer effect. Nevertheless, it is important to mention some key moments in the evolution of business norms. In 1981, BRT published a Statement on Corporate Responsibility, which reached the following conclusions: "Their [the corporation's] importance to the well-being and quality of life of the average person has created perceptions and expectations that go far beyond what many considered their historic purpose, which was the creation of goods and services at a profit. ... Corporations operate within a web of complex, often competing relationships that demand the attention of corporate managers. The decision-making process requires an understanding of the corporation's many constituencies and their various expectations." In short, BRT was calling for a wider set of objectives than financial performance.

In 1997, the same institution seems to have changed its mind. "The principal objective of a business enterprise is to generate economic returns to its owners," it wrote in a white paper. And it stressed, "the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation's stockholders; the interests of other stakeholders are relevant as a derivative of the duty to stockholders."

By 2019, the tide seems to have turned back again. In a highly publicized statement, BRT declared that "While each of our individual companies serves its own corporate purpose, we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders."

So the stated ends of BRT seem to have veered from pluralistic stakeholderism to enlightened shareholderism and back to pluralistic stakeholderism every generation or so. Perhaps the right attitude to such flip-flopping is cynicism; Bebchuk and Tallarita (2022) suggest "the BRT Statement was mostly for show, and the BRT Companies espousing it did not intend or expect it to bring about any material changes in how they treat stakeholders". However, Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) note (and we document), the signatory CEOs may have felt their corporations were already emphasizing a broad range of stakeholders, and they did not feel the need to take further steps. Whatever the motive for the broader BRT change, and regardless of whether corporations intend to follow through after signing on, the pressure to match objectives to those espoused by the BRT might be substantial.

5. What Drives Corporate Objectives: Evidence

In Section 4, we discussed possible reasons why top management wants to emphasize certain goals in their letter to shareholders. In this section, we explore the evidence. We will report correlations, without testing causality. We hope to suggest explanations that are worthy of further investigation by looking at a variety of tests. We start by reviewing the data used.

5.1 Data Description

In Table 3a, we report the summary statistics of the goals identified in the shareholder letters for the period 1955-2020 and 1980-2020. We focus much of the analysis on the latter range for reasons of data availability. Shareholder Value Broad is expressed as a goal in 87% of the cases, followed by growth and customers (75% each). The narrow version of shareholder value maximization is present in only 37% of the cases. The least attention is given to suppliers: only 3% of the cases.

Table 3b presents the summary statistics for measures of profitability, leverage, and R&D expenditures from Compustat. Except for a few private or bankrupt firms, we can get the accounting variables for all the firms in our sample, except for R&D, where the information is sparser. Table 3c-3d presents the definition, the source, and the summary statistics for all the other variables used in the analysis. We will come back to these during the analysis.

5.2 Goals and Visibility

One of the starkest findings thus far is the rise in the number of goals that firms state. One possible explanation is that larger firms are forced to cater to more varied audiences, and espouse more goals. For this reason, in Table 4a we look at the correlation between the number of goals and the size of firms. In column I, we regress the number of goals on the log of assets, controlling for only year-fixed effects. There is a statistically strong positive correlation between the two. This is true even if we control for industry-fixed effects (column II). Thus, one possible explanation for the rise in the number of goals is the increase in the size of firms.

Size can be a proxy for complexity but also for visibility. In column (III) we include the log of the number of New York Times articles mentioning a company in the year as a proxy for visibility. This is statistically significant on its own, but when we control for the log of assets in column (IV), this proxy is no longer correlated with the number of goals. Thus, our proxy for firm visibility seems to be correlated with the number of goals a firm has, but not after controlling for firm size. Finally, when we examine the (unreported) time coefficients estimated in column (IV), we see a steady increase suggesting a rise in the number of goals over time even after we correct for firm size and our proxy for the public interest.

In Table 4b we regress the presence of different types of goals on the log of the number of NYT articles, after controlling for the size of the firm and year and industry fixed effects. Firms that are mentioned more in the NYT are less likely to declare a Shareholder Value Narrow goal or a Stakeholder goal. They are more likely to declare a goal related to Employee, Ethics, Philanthropy, and Innovation. The direction of causality, however, is uncertain: the NYT can find it more interesting/ attractive to write articles about companies that pursue certain goals. In unreported analysis, we conduct an event study checking whether the addition of a goal in the shareholder letter increases the subsequent coverage of that firm in the NYT. The only goal where we find an effect that is borderline statistically significant at the 5% level is

Philanthropy. This suggests that goal adoption is unlikely to drive NYT coverage. Instead, it may be that firms that are more visible in the NYT tend to declare certain goals.

Taking into account the more uniformly positive and significant coefficient on firm size in Table 4b, it seems reasonable to conclude that a firm's size seem to be associated with the firm espousing more goals. Perhaps size is a better proxy for visibility, or perhaps our measure of visibility (NYT coverage) captures only some aspects, since the correlation with some goals is positive and others negative. In what follows, we will typically include firm size as a control.

5.3. Changing Power/Importance of Audiences

We have argued that one factor that may drive a change in objectives is a change in the power and importance of specific constituencies.

5.3.1 Shareholder Constituency

In Table 5, we explore whether the rise in statements of shareholder value goals during the 1980s and 1990s is associated with the rise in institutional ownership and hostile takeovers. In Table 5a column I, the left-hand side is an indicator variable equal to 1 if maximizing Shareholder Value Narrow is an objective in the shareholder letter of that year.¹⁶ On the right-hand side, we have the fraction of equity owned by institutions (this is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by 13F institutions from Thomson Reuters), the log of total assets, and year-fixed effects. Companies that have a greater share of institutional ownership are significantly more likely to state shareholder value as a goal. This effect is not just an industry-specific effect. In fact, in column II when we control for industry-fixed effects, the coefficient is quantitatively larger.¹⁷ An increase in institutional ownership of 20 percentage points (similar to what took place between 1980 and 2000, see Figure 8) is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a shareholder value goal being stated. Thus, the effect is economically meaningful, given that in 1980 Shareholder Value Narrow is present only 6% of the time.

In columns III-VI of Table 5a, we re-estimate the regressions after splitting the sample period into two: 1980 to 2000 and 2000 to 2020, both with and without industry-fixed effects. The positive coefficient is always present and always statistically different from zero.

In Table 5b we repeat what we have done in Table 5a, with the difference that on the right-hand side, we include takeover pressure instead of institutional ownership. Takeover pressure for a firm is calculated as the fraction of assets of firms in the same FF30 industry that receive at least one takeover bid

¹⁶ We use Shareholder Value Narrow instead of Shareholder Value Broad in the regressions because there is more variability in the presence of the former, with the latter trending towards always being present in recent years.

¹⁷ Throughout the paper we use only industry fixed-effects and not firm-fixed effects. The reason is twofold. First, since companies go in and out of the sample, the number of years we have for some companies is fairly limited. Second, as Griliches and Hausman (1986) show, in the presence of measurement errors, firm fixed effects can significantly increase the signal to noise ratio.

in the previous year. The data, which span from 1962 to 2001, were kindly provided to us by Mark Mitchell. Similar to institutional ownership, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between takeover pressure and the presence of shareholder value as a goal. This is true with and without industry-fixed effects. Formally, our measure of takeover pressure starts in 1962 and ends in 2001, but most of the action is in the period 1980 to 2000. When we restrict the attention to this period, the coefficient is almost four times as big. A one-standard-deviation increase in takeover pressure increases the probability of Shareholder Value Narrow as a goal by 3 percentage points.

In Table 5c we repeat Tables 5a and 5b, but with both explanatory variables on the right-hand side. The two variables seem to have independent effects on the probability of mentioning shareholder value in the shareholder letter. Both coefficients are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. Together with industry and year-fixed effects, these two variables are able to explain 15% of the variability in the shareholder value objective in the letter.

5.3.2 Pressure to Favor Customers

Another important trend in the last two decades of the 20th century is the rise in the frequency of customer-oriented goals. This may be driven by increasing competition, forcing firms to acknowledge their customers more. One largely exogenous source of increasing competition has been the penetration of imported products. To explore whether the rise in customer objectives is associated with the increasing pressure from foreign competition, in Table 6a we regress an indicator for whether a firm espouses a Customer goal on the degree of foreign import penetration. In particular, column I has the 2-digit SIC industry share of imports over gross industry output as the main explanatory variable. Firms more exposed to foreign competition are more likely to mention customers as a goal. Since we control for Fama French industry-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, the variation here is coming from the growing import penetration in some industries and the fact that 2-digit SIC industries are not perfectly aligned with Fama French industry indicators. In column II, we include an indicator based on the Rexhausen et al. (2012) classification of whether a firm is in a consumer-facing industry based on its 4-digit SIC code.¹⁸ Not surprisingly, consumer-facing firms are more likely to mention Customer as a goal. In column III, we combine the two specifications adding also an interaction effect. We find that the coefficient estimate for consumer-facing industries remains significant, while the effect of import penetration is only present for consumer-facing firms. As conjectured, firms in consumer-facing industries espouse a consumer objective when import penetration increases.

¹⁸ Rexhausen et al. (2012) define customer-facing industries as all ISIC codes between 15 and 52. We manually looked at the corresponding SIC-4 digit industries which fall in those categories creating an indicator variable which is 1 when the SIC-4 digit industry is deemed as customer-facing (0 otherwise).

Importantly, this result suggests that firms insert a specific objective when catering to that stakeholder becomes important to the firm's future. This is suggestive of the instrumentality of this choice: it is not necessarily a final goal per se, but an interim objective on the path to a greater goal (the profitability of the firm).

5.3.3 Unions

Interestingly, one constituency that has been weakening is unions. While union strength cannot explain the rise in Employee as an objective, it is interesting to see whether the degree of unionization in an industry over time is correlated with the espousal of Employee as a goal by firms in that industry. This is what we do in Table 6b. The explanatory variable is the share of union membership at the Census Industrial Classification industry level, with data starting in 1983. We also include year and industry fixed effects. The coefficient estimate on the share of unionized workers in the firm's industry is positive and significant, suggesting that firms that are in more unionized industries are more likely to emphasize employees as key stakeholders. Later, we will offer additional evidence suggesting that firms with more productive employees also tend to emphasize Employee as a goal.

5.4. Changes in Audience Preferences

Changes in audience preferences can also affect the announcement of objectives. We examine the effect of changes in the preferences of institutional investors and the preferences of society at large.

5.4.1 Changes in Institutional Investor Preferences

In the years following the elaboration of the Principles of Responsible Investing by the United Nations in 2006, an increasing number of institutional investors signed up to uphold them. As Figure 9 shows, until 2011 the number of signatories was limited to less than 100 institutional investors, representing less than \$2 trillion in total assets under management. In the following decade, the number of signatories reached more than \$14 trillion of assets under management.

As Couvert (2022) shows, funds' preferences (as expressed in their guidelines) tend to be reflected in companies' goals. Consequently, in Table 7a we explore how the presence of different goals in the shareholder letter is correlated with the percentage of shares owned by PRI signatories. To separate the effect of PRI signatories from the effect of institutional ownership in general, in the regression we control for the percentage of a firm's shares owned by all institutional investors. In addition, we control for firm size, year-fixed effects, and industry-fixed effects. As Table 7a shows, ownership by PRI funds is correlated with a greater presence of several objectives: this is not limited to the societal category (ESG Environment, ESG Social, and Philanthropy), but also the stakeholder category (Customer, Employee, and Supplier), and even the performance category (Shareholder Value Narrow and Market Share Growth).

How do the preferences of the institutional investor affect companies? One mechanism is the private meetings that institutional investors have. By gaining access to the private correspondence of TIAA-

CREF, Carleton et al. (1998) were able to document the impact that TIAA-CREF had on the governance of firms. Unfortunately, without this kind of access, it is impossible to document this channel. Alternatively, institutional investors can influence firm behavior by providing support to shareholder proposals in the ESG space. Even if institutional investors rarely take the lead in these proposals, the very existence of a core of PRI investors provides social activists with the motivation to present ESG proposals (see Tallarita, 2022). These proposals tend to be influential even when they are not approved because they force board members to take a public position in favor or against the proposal. In this vein, in 1971 a GM board member, Rev. Leo Sullivan, supported a shareholder resolution urging GM to exit South Africa¹⁹, which eventually led to the enunciation of the famous “Sullivan Principles”, articulating the minimum requirements for firms to continue operating in South Africa (Larson, 2020).

Table 7b looks at whether the percentage of PRI investors affects the number of proposals presented in the various areas. It is indeed the case that the greater the percentage of PRI investors, the more societal oriented proposals (ESG Social, ESG Environment, Philanthropy) are presented.

5.4.2. *Changes in the public’s preferences*

Companies (and their CEOs) may also respond to changes in the public’s sensitivities, partly because they mirror them or because they want to gain legitimacy by catering to them. As an indicator of the sensitivity of society about certain issues, we use Google Books Ngram Viewer, which measures how frequently a combination of n words (ngram) has occurred in a corpus of books over the selected years. Figure 10 Panel A plots the frequency of the bigram “accounting fraud” in books (in the English language) between 1955 and 2020 (the scale is on the right-hand side). Not surprisingly, there is a spike in the use of this bigram at the beginning of the new millennium, when the Enron and WorldCom scandals exploded. We superimpose on this graph the frequency of the Ethics goal in shareholder letters (left-hand scale). Even this series exhibits a spike in early 2000. Not only do the two series spike at the same time, but they also drop at the same time, although the frequency of the Ethics goal in shareholder letters stabilizes at a higher plateau – once a corporation starts emphasizing its ethics and values, it may be hard for it to stop entirely in subsequent letters.

In Figure 10 Panel B, we repeat this analysis with the bigram “climate change” and the ESG Environment goal. There is a first increase in the frequency of the bigram “climate change” in the early 1990s and then a second spike starting in 2004. The same is true for the environmental goal in shareholder letters. Of course, there is an earlier blip in the ESG Environment objective in the late 1960s and 1970s, which is unrelated to climate change, but instead is correlated with the rise in the use of words such as “pollution” and “smog”.

¹⁹ <https://soundcloud.com/user-709944723/interview-with-paul-neuhauser-the-arc-of-change-podcast-series-071609>

To put these observations on a firmer footing, in Table 8 we test whether energy firms are more likely to prioritize the environment around major oil-spills. The largest oil spills in North America are in 1969 (Santa Barbara oil spill), in 1989 (Exxon Valdez), and in 2010 (Deepwater Horizon). Thus, in Table 8 we regress the presence of an environmental goal on a dummy for the energy sector and an interaction between the energy sector dummy and a dummy for the year of the oil spill and the year after (we also include year fixed effects). Not surprisingly, energy companies are more likely to espouse environmental objectives, particularly around oil spills.

5.5. Commitment to Improve Firm-Specific Situations

CEOs may use their letter to shareholders to promise to do better on specific dimensions on which they have underperformed, much as the oil industry in the previous section. Thus, the CEO of a company that is relatively unprofitable will claim to pursue shareholder value, the CEO of a company that is heavily indebted will promise to reduce debt and to manage its risk better, the CEO of a company in trouble with the EPA will profess her commitment to the environment. In this sub-section, we explore whether this is the case.

5.5.1. Poor financial performance

In Table 9a, we look at the relationship between Shareholder Value Narrow and profitability, measured as Tobin's Q (columns I and III) or EBITDA over assets (columns II and IV). For comparability, we restrict the sample to non-financial firms. The first two specifications include only year-fixed effects, while the last two include both year and (Fama French) industry-fixed effects. Regardless of the specification, there is a negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient for the measure of profitability. Thus, companies with a lower market-to-book value and those that are less profitable are more likely to state that they want to maximize profits.

5.5.2. Indebtedness

In Table 9b we look at the relationship between the risk management goal and the level of debt, measured as the book value of debt or inverse of interest coverage (Interest Expenses over EBITDA). As in Table 9a, we restrict the sample to non-financial firms. The first two specifications include only year-fixed effects, while the last two include both year and (Fama French) industry-fixed effects. More highly indebted firms are more likely to mention risk management as a goal. This effect is statistically significant at conventional levels, regardless of the inclusion of industry-fixed effects. In fact -- as was the case for profitability -- the magnitudes of the coefficients are unaffected by the presence of industry-fixed effects, suggesting this is a firm-specific phenomenon.

5.5.3. EPA Violations

Finally, in Table 9c we look at the relationship between environmental performance and the presence of environmental goals in the shareholder letter. We use three measures of environmental

violations: the amount and number of US Environmental Protection Agency's penalties, and the number of cases registered against a company by the EPA. As the table shows, firms with a bad environmental record in the previous year are more likely to mention ESG Environment in their shareholder letter (with all three measures the coefficients are positive, and in two out of three statistically different from zero).

5.6. Commitment to Specific Stakeholders

Thus far, we have looked at external changes that affect the power or importance of specific stakeholders. Let us end by looking at circumstances in which CEOs are more likely to favor specific stakeholders, typically when those stakeholders are key determinants of the success of the firm (that is, when the firm practices “enlightened shareholderism”). For instance, employee well-being should be singled out as an objective when the firm’s employees are very productive, i.e. when the payroll per employee is very high.

Table 10a explores this possibility. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the CEO mentions Employee as a goal in the shareholder letter. In column I, besides year-fixed effects, the explanatory variables include the logarithm of the ratio of payroll per employee at the SIC 4-digit industry level. Firms with a higher wage per employee (that is, a more productive workforce) are more likely to mention Employee as a goal. This is true even if we control for Fama French industry-fixed effects (column II). In columns III and IV, we explore in which decade this effect is stronger. Overall, the evidence seems to point to the 1990s as being the decade where the effect is strongest. This corresponds to the period where the share of the Employee goal rose the most (Figure 5 Panel D).

CEOs might use the objectives stated in shareholder letters also to advertise the strengths of their firms to a broader set of stakeholders. Thus, a CEO in an R&D-intensive firm may want to stress the Innovation goal to highlight the innovativeness of the firm she manages. Table 10b explores this possibility by studying the relationship between the presence of Innovation as a goal in the shareholder letter and various measures of innovativeness, from the level of R&D expense over assets to the number of patents the firm generates or its citation-weighted number of patents. Since financial firms do not invest much in R&D and do not develop many patents, we restrict the sample to non-financial firms. The first three columns do not include (Fama-French 30) industry-fixed effects, while the last three do. All specifications include year-fixed effects. The specification using R&D expenses as a measure of innovativeness spans the entire sample, while the others span only the period 1976-2006 when patent data are available.

All three measures of innovation are positively correlated with the mention of innovation as a corporate goal. The insertion of industry-fixed effects, however, reduces the magnitude of the estimated coefficients somewhat, though the coefficient estimates still are statistically significant. Thus, CEOs appear to use the shareholder letter to emphasize the strengths of their companies.

5.7. Managerial Opportunism: Deflection

Sometimes, firms are enveloped in a public issue that is so fraught that the firms involved may want to deflect attention by espousing a broad array of objectives. In 2015, an article by Case and Deaton highlighted the “deaths of despair” produced by the opioid epidemic. Case and Deaton’s work was just the most prominent in a variety of studies and articles on the issue. The Google *n*gram count of the bigram “opioid epidemic” rose sharply. The surprising victory of Donald Trump and his “American carnage” inaugural address drew further media attention to the opioid epidemic and its causes, attention that eventually lead to important legal cases. In Table 11 we study how the stated objectives of the big seven distributors of opioids in our sample (McKesson, Walmart, CVS, Cardinal Health, Walgreens, AmerisourceBergen, and Johnson & Johnson) changed after 2015. Consistent with the hypothesis that there is a proliferation of objectives when companies come under public scrutiny, we find that the big seven are more likely to mention 8 out of 13 objectives after 2015, including Customer, Stakeholders, ESG Environment, and Ethics. Changing public attention thus elicits a corporate response.

5.8. Summary

In sum, we find that CEOs do tend to follow some predictable patterns in espousing goals – suggesting statements are not entirely driven by the personal preferences of CEOs. Typically, the importance and strength of specific stakeholders tend to push CEOs into stating associated goals, as does the desire to retain legitimacy amongst the broader public. Goals stated in response to heightened scrutiny or poor performance could be viewed cynically as attempts to alleviate pressure and deflect attention. Alternatively, they could be seen as commitments to improve. So, the obvious next step is to see whether stated goals are followed by corporate action.

6. Do firms walk the talk?

Is the statement of objectives in shareholder letters a meaningful statement of intent – is it forward guidance to relevant audiences? Or is it simply an attempt at obfuscation and deflection -- CEOs state what is needed at the time to sound good, without making any effort to change anything. To test this possibility, we look at the correlation between the declarations made by managers in their letters and other consequential decisions and outcomes.

6.1 Compensation

When Joe Biden was Vice President of the United States he used to say: "Don't tell me what you value. Show me your budget & I'll tell you what you value."²⁰ In the corporate world, an analogous refrain would

²⁰ <https://twitter.com/vp44/status/562347649429278720?lang=en>

be “Don't tell me what you value. Show me what you reward your executives for and I will tell you what you value.” Thus, in order to determine whether firms walk the talk, we start with compensation.

As Table 3d shows, on average, the fixed salary represents 10 to 12% of the total compensation for the top 5 executives, with another 17 to 19% represented by the annual cash bonus, and the remaining 65 to 73% made up by long-term performance incentives. The long-term incentive plan is solely based on the stock market performance of the company and/or on some other financial measures of corporate profitability. The annual cash bonus, on the other hand, is often explicitly linked to a combination of financial and non-financial metrics, and sometimes altered by a compensation modifier that allows the compensation committee to take into account non-financial metrics in its subjective assessment.

We read through the proxy statements and determined whether annual bonuses were explicitly linked to non-financial metrics and what percentage of their value was linked to non-financial metrics. As Table 3d shows, 33% of the companies use a non-financial metric in the compensation package in 2008, a proportion that has increased significantly over time to 45% in 2020. At the same time, the share of firms with compensation modifiers that determine some part of the bonus based on subjective assessments has fallen from 28% to 13%.

While the explicit presence of non-financial metrics is becoming more widespread, the proportion of total compensation that is linked to non-financial metrics is tiny, even if we restrict attention to those companies that do use non-financial metrics: rising from 3% in 2008 to 4% in 2020.²¹ The finding that only a small fraction of executives' compensations are linked to non-financial metrics is similar to that in Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020), who analyze the compensation structure for the 20 companies whose CEOs sit on the board of the Business Roundtable.

6.1.1. Corporate Goals and Compensation

Now that we have defined terms, we can analyze the relationship between corporate goals stated in the shareholder letter and the metrics used in compensations. This is done in Table 12. The dependent variable is the percentage of total compensation linked to a specific metric and the explanatory variables are an indicator equal to one if that metric is mentioned as a goal in the shareholder letter as well as year indicators.

The compensation metric is positively related to stated objectives in three cases: Innovation, ESG Environment, and ESG Social. Interestingly, for other goals, we do not observe a relationship between how much an objective is compensated and the statement of the objective. One interpretation of this result is that stated objectives are just a sideshow or a form of cheap talk. Another is that performance on non-

²¹ This is consistent with what Geczy et al. (2021) find in private equity. They document that while private equity “impact” funds are themselves evaluated on ESG metrics, they rarely link compensation to these metrics in their portfolio companies.

financial metrics is hard to measure, so companies may be reluctant to compensate on their basis for fear of creating distortions. A final possibility is that objectives like customer service do ultimately contribute to maximizing long-term shareholder value. Therefore, if the top executives are adequately incentivized to pursue long-term shareholder value, there is no need to compensate them separately for Customer (that is, customer service is an interim objective towards the end of long-term shareholder value maximization). Indeed, so long as the creation of long-term shareholder value is compensated, managers have the freedom to weigh interim goals appropriately. In contrast, environmental and social goals are a form of maximization of shareholder welfare, not value (in the language of Hart and Zingales, 2017). These goals, thus, will not be pursued by managers if they are incentivized only by financial indicators of performance. If shareholders want managers to pursue environmental and social goals, they have to compensate them explicitly based on specific metrics. Hence, the observed relationships.

6.2. Goals, actions, and outcomes

Compensation is only one channel through which stated goals can translate into actions. Firms may also initiate processes that are intended to take them to desired outcomes. Of course, whether there is an improvement in outcomes is the ultimate test of whether firms walk the talk, but we have also seen that firms with worse outcomes initiate the talk, so these may also be firms where an actual improvement in outcomes is hard. Let us start with performance on ESG goals, where processes initiated by management are tracked more closely in recent years, and then to long-term financial performance, where outcomes are more carefully measured.

6.2.1. ESG Performance

One of the most established measures of ESG performance comes from Sustainalytics, which assigns a score between 0-100 (with 100 representing the best) to the environmental, social, and governance performance of major companies. If executives walk the talk, we would expect Sustainalytics' scores to be higher for companies that state ESG goals in their shareholder letters. More to the point, we expect that companies that emphasize a particular goal in their letters should perform particularly well along that dimension.

Table 13a correlates the total ESG score and the sub-scores for environmental and social performance with the presence of ESG Environment and ESG Social goals in the shareholder letter. In column I, the left-hand side is the total ESG score, and the right-hand side is an indicator variable equal to 1 if, in the previous year, ESG Environment is mentioned as a goal. The regression controls for industry and time-fixed effects, as do all regressions in this table. There is a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate associated with the presence of an ESG Environment goal in the letter on overall ESG scores.

Column II repeats the same exercise as in Column I, with the only difference being that the explanatory variable of interest is an indicator of whether the ESG Social goal is mentioned. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Column III correlates the Sustainalytics' environmental score with an ESG Environment goal in the letter, while column IV correlates the social score with an ESG Social goal in the letter. In both cases, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant. So firms that espouse environmental or social goals do better on the relevant Sustainalytics metrics.

An immediate concern is that Sustainalytics rewards inputs and programs rather than outcomes. To explore this possibility, in Table 13b we decompose the aggregate Sustainalytics environmental and social scores into their components. We further sort the various components into those which pertain to programs or processes that might help achieve the goal (for example, the firm has “programs to increase workforce diversity”) and those that pertain to outcomes, however imperfectly measured (for example, “Environment fines and non-monetary sanctions”). For each component, we estimate a specification similar to the ones in Table 13a, where the dependent variable is a score on a specific component of the environmental (or social) score, and the explanatory variables are the presence in the letter of the ESG Environment (or ESG Social) goal, year-fixed effects, and industry-fixed effects. When the component is colored in green, it means that when this Sustainalytics measure is included as a dependent variable in the standard regression, the coefficient on the stated ESG goal is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. If the component is colored orange, then the coefficient is negative and significant at similar levels. If uncolored, it means that the coefficient is insignificant.

Having an ESG Environment goal stated in the letter is positively and significantly correlated with 12 of the 37 “process” components of the environmental score that a CEO controls directly, while it is negatively and significantly correlated with only two. By contrast, it is positively and significantly correlated with only three of the 14 “outcome” components, and negatively and significantly correlated with two.

Similarly, an ESG Social goal stated in the letter is positively and significantly correlated with 14 of the 41 “process” components of the social score that a CEO controls directly, and negatively and significantly correlated with only one. Of the 13 “outcome” components, two have a coefficient that is negative and significant, and none is positive and significant.

In sum, when a CEO announces a goal in the letter, they do seem to walk the talk by adopting processes or programs consistent with that goal, which enhances Sustainalytics scores. Yet, positive outcomes do not necessarily follow, perhaps because goals are announced by companies that are underperforming and have an uphill task, or because better outcomes are inherently difficult, and take a long time to achieve. We cannot also rule out the possibility of opportunism -- that firms only focus on

processes or programs that boost Sustainalytics scores rather than those that actually achieve the desired outcomes.

7.2 Long-Term Financial Performance

Long-term financial performance is easier to measure than ESG performance. We use growth (either in assets or in revenues), shareholders' total return, increase in profitability, and increase in dividends, all measured over a 5-year horizon (we have also explored the 10-year horizon with similar results). To avoid selection issues, we compute the left-hand side regardless of whether the firm remains in the sample of the largest 150 companies over the subsequent five years. We control for industry and time-fixed effects and for the starting level of profitability, leverage, and size. Since the observations are overlapping, we use Newey-West standard errors. Table 14 reports the results.

The first two columns examine asset growth. Companies that embrace a shareholder value goal tend to grow significantly less in the following five years. This is true even controlling for the presence of a growth goal (column II). We find the same result if we measure growth in terms of revenues (columns III and IV). A shareholder value goal, however, is not correlated with a higher shareholder return (columns V and VI), higher growth in profitability (columns VII and VIII), or higher growth in dividends per share (columns IX and X).

We saw earlier that companies tend to declare a shareholder value goal when they are not doing particularly well, and it does seem that in doing so, they sacrifice growth. There is no evidence that a focus on shareholder value supports, or is detrimental for, profits long-term. In unreported regressions, we check whether a single-minded focus on Shareholder Value (Narrow) changes our conclusions; When we use as a right-hand side variable an indicator if the firm has Shareholder Value (Narrow) as the only objective, the results are similar.

7. Conclusion

The prevailing narrative has it that during the 1950s and 1960s public corporations were exercising corporate power “in a self-restrained and socially responsible manner” (Cheffins, 2020), that “shareholder primacy took off in the 1970s, starting with a Milton Friedman essay in *The New York Times*” (Indap, 2018), and that the 2019 BRT statement on corporate purpose has represented “a major philosophical shift” (Benoit, 2019).

The picture that emerges from our analysis of shareholder letters over more than 60 years is more nuanced. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the majority of companies did not express any goal in their shareholder letter, but when they did, the main goal often was to increase profits. From 1955 to 1980, shareholder letters became more goal-oriented (from 33% to 58%), but conditional on expressing a goal,

the number of goals increased only slightly (from 1.8 to 2.7). From the 1980s forward, the main change was the proliferation of goals, which reached 7.4 in 2020.

The focus on profit maximization steadily increased from 1955 to 1990, without any discontinuity or acceleration after 1970. The novelty of the 1980s is that the goal of increasing profits is expressed in terms of maximization of shareholder value. We document that the increasing adoption of this phraseology is associated with an increase in institutional investors' ownership and takeover pressure. In subsequent years, however, societal pressure, as well as pressure from institutional investors that had adopted responsible investing guidelines, led corporations to adopt environmental and social objectives as well. In most recent years, corporations seem to be dropping the term "shareholder value", even though they articulate shareholder interests in other ways. In this context, the 2019 Business Roundtable Statement suggesting the purpose of the corporation extended beyond shareholders to all stakeholders does not appear to be a dramatic innovation, but more like a codification of the existing practice. Something similar was the case when the Business Roundtable embraced shareholder value in 1997.

In spite of the proliferation of corporate goals, we find that executive compensation remains overwhelmingly focused on shareholder value, as measured by stock prices and financial performance. While we do observe an increase in the use of environmental and social metrics in compensation, especially by firms that announce such goals, the magnitude of this relationship is still small. We also find corporate statements of ESG goals are associated with policies and programs that favor those goals, but there is little evidence that it improves the firm's measurable ESG outcomes. These findings cast doubt on the hope that self-regulation would suffice to undertake a green transition. Firms seem very responsive to the public mood in words and programs. Better outcomes? Not yet!

There is no evidence that a focus on shareholder value is detrimental (or beneficial) to the long-term health of a corporation, whether that health is measured with profits, dividends, or stock market returns. There is some evidence that focusing on shareholder value might reduce the growth in assets and revenues. At the same time, there is no evidence that the adoption of a shareholder value objective increases profitability or stock returns.

Finally, we neither find corporations to be focused exclusively on shareholder value nor are they pluralistic stakeholder maximizers focused on their corporate social responsibility. Instead, they pick and choose the stakeholders they want to focus attention on, while emphasizing long-term shareholder value, especially in how they compensate. The focus on stakeholders seems to be an interim goal, suggesting that corporations practice "enlightened shareholderism". Of course, they are also opportunistic in when they state goals and how they go about them, suggesting "opportunistic enlightened shareholderism" is the description of corporate behavior that accords best with our evidence.

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Figure 1: Fraction of Annual Reports without a Letter

The Fortune-150 sample used in our study is composed of the top 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the top 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 from 1955 to 2020. The figure below represents the fraction of annual reports that do not contain an annual letter to the shareholders. A letter to the shareholders is defined as a document, usually written/signed by one or more of the Named Executive Officer (refer to Table 2 for the details on who signs these letters) detailing the company’s financial and overall performance in that particular fiscal year. The letter is often followed by the official annual report as mandated by the SEC and also known as the 10K. The 10K that is filed with the SEC often does not necessarily contain the shareholder letter and thus the letter often can only be obtained from the “glossy annual report” that a company publishes itself.




Figure 2: Average Length of Letters per Year, in Terms of Number of Paragraphs

The figure below shows the mean number of paragraphs in the shareholder letters in our Fortune-150 sample, at the yearly level. A Paragraph is defined as a set of sentences where the end of a paragraph is demarcated by the presence of a period, exclamation mark, or question mark, followed by a new line. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 from 1955 to 2020, subject to the availability of the shareholder letter (see Table 1 for details).




Figure 3: Number of Goals Espoused in Shareholder Letters

The figure shows the aggregate trends of objectives mentioned in the shareholder letters. Panel A shows the share of firms in our Fortune-150 sample espousing zero, one, and multiple goals (among the 13 goals) in their letters to shareholders from 1955 to 2020. Panel B represents the annual average of the number of corporate objectives found in the shareholder letters in our Fortune-150 sample from 1955 to 2020, conditional on the shareholder letter containing at least one goal. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500, subject to the availability of shareholder letter (see Table 1 for details)

Panel A: Share of Firms Espousing Goals

Panel B: Average Number of Goals Espoused





Figure 4: Share of Paragraphs predicted to Contain Goals in Shareholder Letters and share Manually Labeled as Goals

The figures below show the share of paragraphs in our Fortune-150 sample over our sample period (1955 to 2020) that are predicted to be goal paragraphs by the sequence of the binary and the multi-class multi-label classifier in Panel A and the share of the 4,500 paragraphs that we manually classified as goals in the labeled dataset in Panel B. In Panel A, the fraction of paragraphs classified as goal by the binary classifier is in blue, of which the fraction that can be further classified into one of the 13 goals is in orange. The fraction of goal paragraphs in our final sample is therefore in orange. The Fortune-150 sample includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenues and the largest 30 financial firms by assets on Fortune 500, subject to the availability of the shareholder letter (see Table 1 for details).

Panel A: Predicted Paragraphs

Panel B: Manually Classified Paragraphs







Figure 5: Aggregate trends of firms espousing objectives conditional upon espousing at least one goal

The figures below plot the aggregate trends of firms espousing various objectives in their shareholder letters. Panel A shows the share of firms mentioning Shareholder value as a goal conditional upon them espousing at least one goal in the shareholder letter in our Fortune-150 sample. Shareholder Value Broad is predicted by the multi-class, multi-label classifier. Shareholder Value Narrow identifies paragraphs with the two-word sequence ‘shareholder’ (or ‘stockholder’, ‘share owner’, ‘stock owner’) and ‘value’, in any order, in a paragraph predicted to be Shareholder Value Broad. Panel B shows the share of shareholder letters mentioning goals in each of the following three categories – Corporate Performance, Other Stakeholders and Society as a whole - in our Fortune-150 sample conditional upon them mentioning at least one goal in the shareholder letter. 1)“Corporate performance” includes Market Share Growth, Innovation, and Risk Management but not Shareholder Value in the chart below; 2)“Other Stakeholders” includes Customer, Employee, Supplier, Community, and Stakeholder; and 3) “Society as a whole” includes Philanthropy, Ethics, ESG Social, and ESG Environment. Panel C shows the proportion of firms mentioning at least one goals that adopt different corporate performance objectives in our Fortune-150 sample. Corporate performance objectives consist of Risk Management, Innovation and Market Share Growth. Panel D represents the proportion of firms mentioning at least one goal that espouse one of the stakeholder objectives in our Fortune-150 sample. Stakeholder objectives consist of Community, Customers, Employees, Stakeholders and Suppliers. Panel E represents the proportion of firms mentioning at least one goal in the letter and that espouse a social objective in our Fortune-150 sample. Social objectives consist of Ethics, ESG Environment, ESG Social, and Philanthropy. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 from 1955 to 2020, subject to the availability of the shareholder letter (see Table 1 for details).


Panel A: Shareholder Value




Panel B: Three Broad Categories of Goals



Panel C: Corporate Performance Goals



Panel D: Stakeholder Objectives



Panel E: Social Objectives






Figure 6: 10-Year Average of the Yearly Net Change of Firms Reporting a Goal

The figures below show the 10-year average of the yearly net change in the number of firms adopting a goal in our Fortune-150 sample. The net change attributed to firms that stay in the sample and start/stop reporting a goal is represented by the blue bar. In orange is the net change from firms entering/leaving the sample. We compute the net changes every year and then we average them over each decade. Panel A shows the results for Shareholder Value (Narrow), Panel B shows ESG Environment and Panel C shows the results for ESG Social. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 from 1955 to 2020, subject to the availability of shareholder letter (see Table 1 for details).

Panel A: Shareholder Value (Narrow)

Panel B: ESG Environment



Panel C: ESG Social






Figure 7: Correlation Plots between Shareholder Letter Goals

The figures below represent the correlation matrix between the 12 different corporate objectives/goals as measured using the Pearson correlation co-efficient is represented below for our Fortune-150 sample. We drop the Stakeholder objective because it has too few observations. SHAREHOLDER_VALUE here refers to the Shareholder Value Broad objective, because the Shareholder Value Narrow was not present in the early years. Panel A shows the plots for 1955-59, Panel B for 1975-79, Panel C for 1995-99 and Panel D for 2015-20. The sample includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 from 1955 to 2020, subject to the availability of shareholder letter (see Table 1 for details).

Panel A: Correlation Plots between Shareholder Letter Goals (1955-1959)




Panel B: Correlation Plots between Shareholder Letter Goals (1975-1979)



Panel C: Correlation Plots between Shareholder Letter Goals (1995-1999)

1995-1999



Panel D: Correlation Plots between Shareholder Letter Goals (2015-2020)

2015-2020




Figure 8: Evolution of Institutional Ownership

The figure below shows the average fraction of outstanding shares of our Fortune-150 firms owned by 13F institutions. Data are from Thomson Reuters. The Fortune 150 firms are composed of the top 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the top 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 from 1955 to 2020.




Figure 9: Number of PRI Signatories and Total Assets under Management by Year

In the figure below the blue bars represent the cumulative number of 13F asset managers who signed the United States Principles of Responsible Investments (PRI) (left Y axis). The green line represents the cumulative assets under management (AUM) under these signatories (right Y axis). The data for PRI signatories is obtained from the UNPRI database available online. The asset managers found in the UNPRI database were then matched with their respective counterparts in the 13F institutional holdings database provided by Thomson Reuters.





Figure 10: Firm Objectives and Google N-grams

The figures below plot the trend of firm objectives juxtaposed with the mention of relevant Google-N-grams as a proportion of all bigrams in published books over time. Panel A shows the trend of firms espousing *Ethics* (plotted on the Left-Y-axis in blue) as a goal in their letter to shareholders juxtaposed with the mention of “Accounting Fraud” (and its lower-case variations, plotted on the Right-Y-axis in red) in Google N-grams. Panel B shows the proportion of firms espousing *ESG Environment* (plotted against the Left-Y-axis in blue) as a goal with the mention of “Climate Change” (and its lower-case variations plotted against the Right-Y-axis in red) in Google N-grams. The Fortune 150 sample is composed of the top 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the top 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 (1955-2020).

Panel A: Ethics vs “Accounting Fraud”



Panel B: ESG Environment vs “Climate Change”




Table 1: Coverage of the Sample over Time

The table below represents the overall summary of letter collection for our Fortune 150 sample, which is composed of the top 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the top 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 for the years 1955 to 2020. We report here the summary of shareholder letters collected for the sample and the percentage covered for the 20 years sub-periods 1955-1974, 1975-1994, 1995-2014, the 6-year sub-period 2015-2020, and for the entire sample. The table is divided into two subsections. The first subsection presents how many letters we lose because i) The company is private, ii) The company only produced a 10-K for that year, but not a separate annual report with a letter. The second subsection represents how many reports i) were unreadable, ii) we were not able to locate them anywhere. Overall, we were able to collect 96% of the annual reports from the potential sample and 91% of the initial sample.

	1955-1974	1975-1994	1995-2014	2015-2020	1955-2020
Initial sample	3000	3000	3000	900	9900
Companies that are Private	3	65	26	3	97
10K - with no Letter	1	4	268	169	442
% 10K with no Letter	0%	0%	9%	19%	4%
Potential sample	2996	2931	2706	728	9361
Report Found but Unreadable	6	10	0	0	16
Report not Found	72	235	72	4	383
Final sample	2918	2686	2634	724	8962
% of Potential Sample	97%	92%	97%	99%	96%
% of Initial Sample	97%	90%	88%	80%	91%

Table 2: Signatory Analysis

The table below summarizes the various signatories to the annual letter to shareholders. We tabulate who signs the letter at the year-end of each decade over the course of our sample i.e., from 1955 to 2020. The signatories are divided into 17 different categories as per their titles in the letter. We then further report 1) If the position of chairman exists (Chairman Exists); 2) If a Chairman who is not at the same time CEO or President signs the letter (Chairman not CEO); 3) If a CEO/President who is also the Chairman signs the letter (CEO/President also Chairman); 4) If a CEO or President who is not the Chairman signs the letter (CEO or President but not Chairman); 5) If any other person signs the letter which includes, Vice President, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Director and Head of a special committee (Others).

Year	Letters Available	Signatures per Letter	Chairman Exists	Chairman not CEO	CEO/President also Chairman	CEO or President but not Chairman	Others
1960	148	1.6	84%	61%	5%	89%	5%
1970	147	1.8	93%	65%	18%	79%	11%
1980	143	1.7	99%	38%	52%	47%	15%
1990	126	1.5	100%	21%	73%	27%	9%
2000	142	1.4	100%	16%	82%	18%	9%
2010	124	1.2	100%	13%	70%	27%	2%
2020	128	1.1	100%	16%	50%	45%	3%

Table 3a: Summary Statistics of Shareholder Letters' Goals

The table below represents the descriptive statistics of the goals/objectives mentioned in the annual letter to shareholders in our Fortune 150 sample. The Fortune 150 sample used below is composed of the top 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the top 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 between 1955-2020. The first table reports the summary for the whole sample period i.e., from 1955-2020, and the second table is restricted to letters from 1980 to 2020.

1955-2020 Summary of Objectives			
Objectives	(I)	(II)	(III)
Objectives	Mean	SD	N
Shareholder value Broad	0.65	0.48	8962
Shareholder value Narrow	0.23	0.42	8962
Market Share Growth	0.53	0.50	8962
Risk Management	0.17	0.37	8962
Innovation	0.27	0.44	8962
Customer	0.54	0.50	8962
Community	0.19	0.39	8962
Employee	0.30	0.46	8962
Stakeholder	0.06	0.23	8962
Supplier	0.03	0.17	8962
ESG Environment	0.16	0.37	8962
ESG Social	0.11	0.31	8962
Ethics	0.12	0.32	8962
Philanthropy	0.09	0.28	8962

1980-2020 Summary of Objectives			
	(I)	(II)	(III)
Objectives	Mean	SD	N
Shareholder value Broad	0.87	0.34	5308
Shareholder value Narrow	0.37	0.48	5308
Market Share Growth	0.75	0.43	5308
Risk Management	0.27	0.44	5308
Innovation	0.37	0.48	5308
Customer	0.75	0.43	5308
Community	0.29	0.45	5308
Employee	0.43	0.50	5308
Stakeholder	0.09	0.29	5308
Supplier	0.05	0.21	5308
ESG Environment	0.23	0.42	5308
ESG Social	0.14	0.35	5308
Ethics	0.18	0.39	5308
Philanthropy	0.13	0.34	5308

Table 3b: Summary Statistics of COMPUSTAT Variables

The table below reports the summary statistics of the COMPUSTAT variables for the period 1980 to 2020 for our Fortune-150 sample during the same period. The Fortune-150 sample that we use consists of the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 that provide a letter to shareholders and can be identified in COMPUSTAT in the corresponding year. Assets and revenue are reported in millions of dollars. Interest coverage inverse is a ratio of interest expense to EBITDA and book leverage is debt to assets. All the variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile of the cross-sample distribution.

Variables	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	N
Assets	97861.32	25982	247000	509.49	2820000	5185
Revenue	34058.28	20122.40	42847.78	1337.08	434000	5182
Tobin's Q	1.63	1.30	0.97	0.32	9.55	4198
EBITDA / Assets	0.13	0.13	0.08	-0.07	0.44	5094
Return on assets	0.05	0.04	0.05	-0.60	0.24	5185
Book leverage	0.26	0.24	0.16	0.00	1.09	5176
Interest coverage inverse	0.18	0.12	0.22	0.00	7.43	4572
R&D expense / Assets	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.30	2785

Table 3c: Summary Statistics of the Other Variables Used in the Paper

The table below describes summary statistics for variables used in regression tables 4, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b, 8,9a,9b,9c, 10a,10b, 11, 12, 13a, 13b and 14. The duration each database covers is stated in the subtitle of each database below. Institutional ownership is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by 13F institutions; data are from Thomson Reuters and are available from 1980-2020. The takeover pressure for a firm is calculated as the fraction of assets of the firms in the same FF30 (Fama-French industry codes) industry that received at least one takeover bid in the previous year; data is provided by Mark Mitchell and is available from 1962-2001. Number of patents represent the number of patents filed by a firm in a year, and the number of patent citations represents the total number of citations received by the patents of a firm within 5 years since they were filed. Both are calculated using data from NBER patent data project (PDP); PDP data is available from 1976-2006. The signatories of the United Nation Principles for Responsible Investments (PRI) are collected from the PRI directory available on the PRI website, the PRI signatories then are matched with the investment/asset managers as found in the Thomson Reuters 13F institutional holdings database. For each year in a firm, we calculate the PRI ownership as the fraction of shares owned by the PRI signatories in that particular firm. The data on PRI Ownership is available from 2006-2020 as PRI was established in 2006. The number of NYT articles refers to the yearly number of New York Times articles mentioning the name of a firm in our sample in their title, abstract, lead paragraph or snippet. The data source is New York Times Archive. The EPA data comes from the US Environmental Protection Agency's Integrated Compliance Enforcement System - Federal Enforcement and Compliance case-wise database. The sample ranges from 1974-2020. EPA Penalty is the US dollar amount of federal, state, and local penalties charged to the firm. The number of EPA penalties reflects the number of case settlements that result in a penalty. The number of cases registered represents the cases lodged against the corporation in any given year with the EPA. Data on ESG Scores and its constituents are from Sustainalytics. Sustainalytics rates companies on Environmental, Social and Governance parameters, where it scores the firms yearly between 0-100, with 100 representing the best possible rating. Total ESG score is the weighted average of all Environmental, Social and Governance scores indicators. Environment score is a weighted score on how the company performs on environmental conservation, compliance, policy, emissions and other environmental performance metrics. Social Score is the weighted average score representing how well a company performs on employee welfare, public relations, fair trade and other societal perception metrics. The score for programs to increase workforce diversity rates represent how the company policy to increase workforce diversity has fared in the year of assessment. The Environmental fines score is a relative measure of the environmental fines and non-monetary sanctions levied on the firm (a higher score means lower fines). Score representing revenue from clean technology reflects a relative score of the proportion of revenue derived from clean technology and other climate-friendly products. Board diversity score represents the relative diversity of a company's board of directors. The score representing percent cash donations is the relative score measuring how much a company donates to philanthropic causes out of its net earnings before taxes (NEBT). Employee related controversies or incidents score measures how infrequent such incidents are (higher score means lower/no incidence). Employee turnover rate denotes how low turnover is among a firm's employees (higher score means lower turnover). The sample ranges from 2010 to 2019. Data on long-term performance is taken from COMPUSTAT. Asset growth is measured as the growth in firm assets over 5 years. Revenue growth is measured as the growth in the firm's total revenue over 5 years. Cumulative stock returns are estimated for every 5-year period. Growth in EBITDA by revenue is estimated for each firm for a period of 5 years. Growth in dividend per share is estimated for each firm for a period of 5 years. The SIC 4-digit industry level Ln(Payroll/Employee) is the total payroll at the SIC-4-digit industry level divided by the total number of employees in the corresponding industry. Data spans all manufacturing industries and is sourced from NBER-CES Productivity Database with the sample ranging from 1958 to 2018. SIC-2 digit Imported Share is the Ratio of Total Imports to Gross Output of the SIC-2-digit industry to which the company belongs. Industry-wise import data is sourced from UN Comtrade Database which spans the time frame of 1962 to 2020. Gross Output data is sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We create the indicator Consumer-Facing SIC-Industry based on SIC-4-digit industry belonging to Fast Moving Consumer Goods, Retail Trade, Rail, Road, Air and Water Transport, Accommodation, Medical Services, and other services based. We refer to Rexhausen, Pibernik, and Kaiser (2012) for the definition of consumer-facing industries. Labor Union Membership data is obtained from Hirsch & Macpherson (2003) (URL: <https://unionstats.com/>). The Unionization membership data is defined at the Census Industrial Classification (CIC) industry-level. Membership % is defined as the percentage of employees who are part of labor unions in a firm's CIC industry code.

Institutional Ownership - 1980 to 2020	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	N
Institutional ownership	0.62	0.63	0.19	0	2.50	4423
Takeover Pressure - 1962 to 2001						
Takeover pressure	0.05	0.04	0.06	0	0.73	2468
NBER Patent Data Project (PDP) - 1976 to 2006						
Number of patents	119.62	9	289.21	0	4344	2732
Number of patent citations	844.08	41	2632.34	0	48541	2732
United Nation Principles of Responsible Investing (UNPRI) - 2006 to 2020						
PRI Ownership	0.24	0.27	0.16	0.00	0.79	1565
NYT Archives - 1955 to 2020						
Number of NYT Articles	22.3	4	58	0	1078	8409
EPA Case-wise Database - 1974 to 2020						
EPA Penalty	55557	0	586005	0	25000000	7641
No. of EPA Penalties	.0171	0	.154	0	3	7641
No. of Cases Registered	.0171	0	.164	0	6	7641
Sustainalytics - 2010 to 2019						
Total ESG Score	60	59.9	8.64	39	86.8	2296
Environment Score	58.2	57.2	13.3	24.3	96.8	2286
Social Score	58.5	58	10.4	29	90.7	2286
Programs to Increase Workforce Diversity	.512	.333	.564	0	3.68	2286
Environmental Fines and Non-monetary Sanctions	.795	.758	.479	0	3.11	2161
Board Diversity	.77	.8	.238	0	1.25	1762
Percent Cash Donations of NEBT	.603	.468	.461	0	2	1533
Employee Related Controversies or Incidents	4.12	4	1.47	0	9	2296
Employee Turnover Rate	.141	0	.279	0	2.13	2161
Long Term-Performance - 1955 to 2020						
Asset growth over 5-years	0.52	0.42	0.68	-0.93	12.50	7430
Revenue growth over 5-years	0.53	0.36	5.92	-146	434	7404
Cumulative Stock Return over 5-years	0.58	-0.01	27.70	-1	2226	6586
Growth in EBITDA/Revenue over 5 years	0.02	-0.01	3.23	-132.76	161.36	6171
Growth in Dividend per Share over 5 years	0.18	0.06	1.73	-1.00	74.00	5653
NBER CES Productivity Database - 1958 to 2018						
SIC Ln (Payroll/Employee)	10.07	10.19	0.88	8.14	11.76	2621
Total payroll in \$1m	4119.63	2800.10	3952.89	58.00	22245.30	2621
Total value added in \$1m	18759.90	9164.70	25099.08	128.60	121000	2621
Total employment in 1000s	145.45	96.50	124.07	1.40	565.4	2621
Import penetration - 1962 to 2020						
SIC-2 digit Imported Share	0.06	0.02	0.09	0	0.67	7651
Consumer-Facing SIC Industry	0.52	1	0.50	0	1	8363
Unionization - 1983 to 2020						
Membership%	13.82	7.06	15.04	0.00	83.58	4232.00

Table 3d: Executive Compensation Summary Statistics

The table below presents the summary statistics for the executive compensation data collected from the annual DEF 14A filings for the years: 2008, 2013, 2018, and 2020 for the Fortune-150 sample of those respective years. The Fortune-150 sample includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 for the years defined above. We collected data regarding the overall pay mix of the CEOs. We focus on the basic elements of a CEO's Pay, which include Base Salary, Annual Bonus, and a Long-Term Incentive Program. The element of our interest, in this case, is the Annual Bonus, as it is exclusively the portion of a CEO's salary that has some form of compensation linked to non-financial performance. For each component of the compensation, we summarize the frequency with which it is present in our sample and the average fraction of total compensation it represents when present (hence the sum of the metrics does not add up to 100). By Any kind of Non-Financial Metrics or CM, we refer to the presence of either pure non-financial metrics, i.e., specific goals that are assigned specific percentages as part of annual bonus, or the existence of a compensation modifier which is a discretionary allocation by the compensation committee based upon its subjective evaluation of the individual performance of the respective officer. We classify these subjective measures broadly under 3 categories which are: 1) Societal Metrics (which include ESG-Social, ESG-Environment, and Ethics); 2) Stakeholder-based Metrics (which include Suppliers, Customers, Employees, Community, and Stakeholders); 3) Performance-based (which include Innovation and Risk Management). The columns under the Presence category represent the mean of various metrics and the columns under the % category represent the average % of these metrics in the overall compensation of the CEO, conditional on that metric being present.

Executive Compensation Summary Statistics by Year								
Variable names	Presence (frequency)				% of Total Compensation			
	2008	2013	2018	2020	2008	2013	2018	2020
Base Salary	0.96	1.00	0.98	0.99	11.17	11.65	10.97	9.95
Annual Cash Bonus	0.93	0.96	0.95	0.93	19.18	18.61	17.82	17.41
Long-term-Incentive program	0.95	0.99	0.98	0.99	65.03	69.74	70.49	72.64
Bonus based on Financial Metric (FM)					16.00	15.94	13.54	13.48
Total % Compensation based on FM					81.03	85.68	84.03	86.12
Non-Financial Metrics (NF)	0.33	0.30	0.41	0.45	3.19	2.67	4.28	3.93
Compensation Modifier (CM)	0.28	0.31	0.07	0.13	23.52	10.45	2.23	7.92
Any kind of NF Metric or CM	0.58	0.59	0.45	0.57				
Both NF metric and CM	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01				
Societal NF Metrics	0.19	0.18	0.21	0.37	1.20	1.54	1.54	1.37
ESG Social	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.37	1.01	1.04	1.31	0.87
ESG Environment	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.93	1.07	1.31	0.64
Ethics	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.12	0.65	1.09	0.69	1.05
Performance-Based NF Metrics	0.20	0.11	0.27	0.36	0.99	0.99	1.66	1.17
Product Development & Innovation	0.20	0.08	0.25	0.34	0.99	0.83	1.66	0.95
Risk Management	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.06		1.58	1.73	1.56
Stakeholder-Based NF Metrics	0.32	0.24	0.38	0.44	2.11	1.63	2.60	1.93
Supplier	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.63	0.83	1.00	0.92
Customer Satisfaction	0.23	0.10	0.20	0.38	1.39	1.22	1.88	0.96
Employee	0.29	0.20	0.34	0.42	1.05	1.07	1.76	0.85
Community	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.04		1.22		0.94
Stakeholder	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.10	1.74	0.81	1.61	0.64
N	130	132	138	134				

Table 3e: Shareholder Proposals and their Summary Statistics

The table below reports the summary Statistics for the Shareholder Proposals in each of our stated goal categories/corporate objectives for the period 1997-2020. These data are used for the regression in Table 7b. Since we specifically want to study the effects of proposals in the Societal and the Stakeholder Categories, we only consider proposals specific to these objectives and exclude proposals referring to Shareholder Value (Broad or Narrow) and Corporate Performance (Innovation, Market Share Growth, and Risk Management). The Shareholder's proposals data was collected from the ISS Shareholder Proposals Database for 1997-2020 and Proxymonitor's database for 2006-2020 for the Fortune-150 sample from 1997 to 2020. The two databases were merged to maximize coverage. They were filtered to remove any duplicates. The Fortune-150 sample used includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500.

Variables	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	N
ESG Social	0.127	0	0.412	0	6	3031
ESG Environment	0.126	0	0.497	0	7	3031
Ethics	0.008	0	0.099	0	2	3031
Philanthropy	0.01	0	0.097	0	1	3031
Stakeholder	0.005	0	0.072	0	1	3031
Employee	0.06	0	0.246	0	2	3031
Community	0.005	0	0.072	0	1	3031
Supplier	0.001	0	0.031	0	1	3031
Customer	0.001	0	0.036	0	1	3031

Table 4: Number of Goals, Size, and Frequency of NYT Articles

The regression below spans 1955 to 2020 and includes the Fortune-150 sample for those years. The Fortune-150 sample includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the number of goals mentioned in the shareholder letter. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the specific goal in each column is present in the letter that year. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. Ln (# of NYT Articles) is the natural log of the number of articles published in the New York Times in that year carrying the name of the company in its title, abstract, lead paragraph, or snippet. All specifications include Fama-French industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust Standard Errors are in brackets.

Panel A				
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
	Number of Goals	Number of Goals	Number of Goals	Number of Goals
Ln (Assets)	0.173*** (0.019)	0.263*** (0.025)		0.254*** (0.026)
Ln (# of NYT Articles)			0.059*** (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)
Constant	1.987*** (0.172)	1.156*** (0.231)	3.493*** (0.032)	1.214*** (0.234)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry FE		Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.552	0.564	0.559	0.564
Observations	8343	8343	8343	8343

	Panel B													
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)	(VIII)	(IX)	(X)	(XI)	(XII)	(XIII)	(XIV)
	Performance Objectives					Stakeholder Objectives					Social Objectives			
	Shareholder										ESG			
	Shareholder Value (Broad)	Value (Narrow)	Market Share Growth	Innovation	Risk Management	Community	Customer	Employee	Stakeholder	Supplier	Environment	ESG Social	Ethics	Philanthropy
Ln(# of NYT Articles)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)
Ln(Assets)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.030*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.004)
Constant	0.422*** (0.047)	0.057 (0.047)	0.578*** (0.051)	0.243*** (0.049)	-0.031 (0.043)	-0.074 (0.046)	0.319*** (0.050)	0.102* (0.054)	-0.012 (0.028)	0.026 (0.021)	-0.106*** (0.041)	-0.083** (0.037)	-0.114*** (0.037)	-0.113*** (0.033)
Year-FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.354	0.264	0.333	0.227	0.201	0.245	0.396	0.199	0.185	0.061	0.271	0.157	0.179	0.157
Observations	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343	8343

Table 5a: Institutional Ownership and the Goal of Maximizing Shareholder Value

The regression below for the “Full Period” uses data from 1980 to 2020 and includes the Fortune-150 sample for those years. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. SVM (Narrow) is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm espouses shareholder value maximization in the narrow sense in its shareholder letter in that year. Institutional ownership is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by 13F institutions; data are from Thomson Reuters and are available from 1980-2020. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. Year fixed effects are always included, the inclusion of industry (Fama-French 30) fixed effects are indicated below. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)
	SVM (Narrow)	SVM (Narrow)	SVM (Narrow)	SVM (Narrow)	SVM (Narrow)	SVM (Narrow)
	Full Period	Full Period	1980 to 2000	1980 to 2000	2000 to 2020	2000 to 2020
Institutional Ownership	0.198*** (0.046)	0.288*** (0.050)	0.178*** (0.066)	0.222*** (0.078)	0.200*** (0.064)	0.255*** (0.068)
Ln(Assets)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.051*** (0.009)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.042*** (0.015)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.012)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.092	0.119	0.124	0.148	0.019	0.089
Observation	4412	4412	2111	2111	2421	2420

Table 5b: Takeover Pressure and the Goal of Maximizing Shareholder Value

The regression below for the “Full Period” uses data from 1962 to 2001 and includes the Fortune-150 sample for those years. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. SVM (Narrow) is an indicator of whether a firm espouses shareholder value maximization in the narrow sense in its shareholder letter in a year. The takeover pressure on a firm is calculated as the fraction of assets of the firms in the same FF30 industry that receives at least one takeover bid in the previous year; data are available from 1962-2001. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. Year fixed effects are always included, the inclusion of industry (Fama-French 30) fixed effects are indicated below. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I) SVM (Narrow) Full Period	(II) SVM (Narrow) Full Period	(III) SVM (Narrow) 1980 to 2000	(IV) SVM (Narrow) 1980 to 2000
Takeover Pressure	0.113*** (0.039)	0.121*** (0.041)	0.447*** (0.147)	0.410*** (0.147)
Ln(Assets)	0.008* (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)	0.019** (0.008)	0.018 (0.012)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.251	0.262	0.123	0.145
Observation	5265	5265	2691	2691

Table 5c: Institutional Ownership, Takeover Pressure, and the Goal of Maximizing Shareholder Value

The regression below spans 1980 to 2000 and includes the Fortune-150 sample for those years. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. SVM (Narrow) is an indicator of whether a firm espouses shareholder value maximization in the narrow sense in its shareholder letter in a year. Institutional ownership is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by 13F institutions; data are from Thomson Reuters and are available from 1980-2020. The takeover pressure on a firm is calculated as the fraction of assets of the firms in the same FF30 industry that receives at least one takeover bid in the previous year; data are available from 1962-2001. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. Year fixed effects are always included, the inclusion of industry (Fama-French 30) fixed effects are indicated below. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I) SVM (Narrow) 1980 to 2000	(II) SVM (Narrow) 1980 to 2000
Institutional Ownership	0.179*** (0.066)	0.225*** (0.078)
Takeover Pressure	0.536*** (0.172)	0.511*** (0.170)
Ln(Assets)	0.029*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.015)
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	Yes
R-squared	0.127	0.151
Observation	2111	2111

Table 6a: Consumer-Facing Industries, Competition, and Customer Goal

The regression below spans 1962 to 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the 30 largest financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. The dependent variable is the indicator for the presence of the Customer goal in the firm's shareholder letter. The explanatory variables are the SIC-2 Digit Import Share, the Consumer-Facing Industry Indicator, and we control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. SIC-2-digit Import Share is the Ratio of Total Imports to Gross Output of the SIC-2-digit industry to which the company belongs. Industry-wise import data is sourced from UN Comtrade Database (1962-2020). Gross Output data is sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We create the indicator Consumer-Facing SIC-Industry based on SIC-4-digit industry belonging to Fast Moving Consumer Goods, Retail Trade, Rail, Road, Air and Water Transport, Accommodation, Medical Services, and other services. We refer to Rexhausen, Pibernik, and Kaiser (2012) for the definition of consumer-facing industries. All specifications use Fama-French 30 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets.

	(I)	(II) Customers	(III)
SIC-2 digit Imported Share	0.152** (0.068)		0.082 (0.077)
Consumer-Facing SIC Industry=1		0.056*** (0.014)	0.035** (0.017)
Consumer-Facing SIC Industry=1 # SIC-2 digit Imported Share			0.250** (0.099)
Ln(Assets)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)
Constant	0.364*** (0.050)	0.287*** (0.048)	0.355*** (0.051)
Industry & Year-FE	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.386	0.398	0.389
Observations	7609	8307	7573

Table 6b: Unionization and Employee goal

The regression below spans 1983 to 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the 30 largest financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. The dependent variable is the indicator for the presence of the Employee goal in the firm's shareholder letter. Union Membership % is defined as the percentage of employees who are part of labor unions in a firm's CIC industry. Union Membership% is lagged by one year in the regression. Labor Union Membership data is obtained from Hirsch & Macpherson (2003) (URL: <https://unionstats.com/>). We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. All specifications use Fama-French industry fixed effects and year-fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust Standard Errors are in brackets.

	(I) Employees
Membership% _{t-1}	0.366*** (0.103)
Ln(Assets)	0.0350*** (0.0102)
Constant	0.0546 (0.109)
Industry & Year FE	Y
R-squared	0.0978
Observations	3617

Table 7a: PRI Ownership and Goals in Shareholder Letters

The regression below spans from 2006 to 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the 30 largest financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. The dependent variable in each column is an indicator for the presence of the specified goal in the firm's shareholder letter. The explanatory variables include Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) Ownership, which is defined as the fraction of a firm's equity owned by institutions/asset managers that are PRI signatories. The PRI signatories are collected from the PRI directory available on the PRI website; the PRI signatories then are matched with the investment/asset managers as found in the Thomson Reuters 13f institutional holdings database. Total institutional ownership is from the Thomson Reuters 13f institutional holdings database. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. All specifications use Fama-French industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust Standard Errors are in brackets.

	(I) Shareholder Value (Narrow)	(II) Market Share Growth	(III) Innovation	(IV) Risk Management
PRI Ownership	0.635** (0.278)	0.838*** (0.211)	0.270 (0.267)	-0.389 (0.268)
Total Institutional Ownership	0.0933 (0.168)	-0.231 (0.140)	-0.261 (0.163)	0.374** (0.156)
Ln(Assets)	0.0616*** (0.0149)	0.00162 (0.0129)	-0.00181 (0.0143)	0.101*** (0.0134)
Constant	-0.416** (0.211)	0.763*** (0.187)	0.568*** (0.206)	-0.902*** (0.193)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.110	0.0756	0.217	0.200
Observations	1565	1565	1565	1565

	(V) Community	(VI) Customer	(VII) Employee	(VIII) Stakeholder	(IX) Supplier	(X) ESG Environment	(XI) ESG Social	(XII) Ethics	(XIII) Philanthropy
PRI Ownership	0.954*** (0.270)	0.418* (0.221)	0.581** (0.279)	0.253 (0.233)	0.284* (0.156)	0.700*** (0.270)	0.508** (0.236)	0.165 (0.243)	0.810*** (0.235)
Total Institutional Ownership	-0.426** (0.170)	-0.278** (0.122)	-0.321* (0.165)	-0.215 (0.133)	-0.156** (0.0787)	-0.601*** (0.153)	-0.150 (0.137)	-0.216 (0.148)	-0.0774 (0.135)
Ln(Assets)	0.0435*** (0.0145)	-0.0163* (0.00924)	0.0294* (0.0151)	0.0273** (0.0124)	-0.00428 (0.00687)	0.0417*** (0.0141)	0.0210* (0.0122)	0.0303** (0.0136)	0.0795*** (0.0120)
Constant	0.0664 (0.208)	1.109*** (0.149)	0.302 (0.214)	-0.0144 (0.178)	0.138 (0.0990)	0.179 (0.204)	0.00926 (0.174)	0.0138 (0.194)	-0.767*** (0.167)
Ind. & Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.174	0.321	0.100	0.129	0.102	0.235	0.201	0.0733	0.127
Observations	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565

Table 7b: Shareholder Proposals and % of PRI Ownership

The regression below spans from 2006 to 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the 30 largest financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. The dependent variable in each column is the number of shareholder proposals submitted that correspond to the shareholder's letter's goal for each firm each year. The shareholder's proposals data was collected from a combination of the ISS shareholder proposals database for 1997-2020 and Proxymonitor's database for 2006-2020. Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) Ownership is the fraction of a firm's equity owned by institutions that are PRI signatories. The PRI signatories are collected from the PRI directory available on the PRI website; the PRI signatories then are matched with the investment managers as found in the Thomson Reuters 13f institutional holdings database. Total institutional ownership is from the Thomson Reuters 13f institutional holdings database. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets used to control for firm size and is obtained from COMPUSTAT. All specifications use Fama-French industry fixed effects and year-fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust Standard Errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)	(VIII)	(IX)
	Stakeholder Proposals					Social Proposals			
	Community	Customer	Employee	Stakeholder	Supplier	ESG Environment	ESG Social	Ethics	Philanthropy
PRI Ownership	0.0168 (0.0731)	-0.0323 (0.0210)	0.0719 (0.125)	0.0212 (0.0407)	-0.0270 (0.0181)	0.693** (0.290)	0.326* (0.195)	0.0602 (0.0473)	0.131** (0.0582)
Total Institutional Ownership	0.0429** (0.0190)	0.0186 (0.0146)	-0.113* (0.0641)	0.0118 (0.0163)	0.0175 (0.0112)	-0.125 (0.147)	0.0353 (0.0919)	0.0141 (0.0218)	-0.0461 (0.0317)
Ln(Assets)	0.00606 (0.00383)	0.000544 (0.00125)	0.0332*** (0.00865)	0.00782** (0.00309)	0.00204 (0.00137)	0.191*** (0.0240)	0.119*** (0.0175)	0.0119** (0.00485)	0.0146*** (0.00447)
Constant	-0.0952 (0.0643)	-0.0104 (0.0198)	-0.232** (0.111)	-0.0931** (0.0394)	-0.0275 (0.0195)	-1.979*** (0.311)	-1.245*** (0.211)	-0.145** (0.0601)	-0.145*** (0.0552)
Industry & Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.0777	0.0238	0.102	0.0527	0.110	0.240	0.158	0.0657	0.0856
Observations	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565	1565

Table 8: Oil spill and ESG Environment

The regression below spans from 1955 to 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the 30 largest financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. ESG Environment is an indicator of whether a firm espouses the ESG Environment goal in a year. Oil spill is an indicator of the years 1969-70, 1989-90, and 2010-11, corresponding to the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. Energy is an indicator that a firm is in the petroleum and natural gas industry, according to Fama-French 30. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I) ESG ENV
Energy	0.181*** (0.015)
Oil spill x Energy	0.188*** (0.061)
Ln(Assets)	-0.002 (0.003)
Year FE	Yes
R-squared	0.227
Observation	8303

Table 9a: Tobin's Q and EBITDA/Assets and Shareholder Value (Narrow)

The regression below spans from 1955 to 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue in the annual list of Fortune 500. SVM (Narrow) is an indicator of whether a firm espouses shareholder value maximization in the narrow sense in a year. Tobin's Q and EBITDA/Assets are calculated from COMPUSTAT, then winsorized at 1% for outliers. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. The inclusion of year and industry (Fama-French 30) fixed effects are indicated underneath. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
	SVM (Narrow)	SVM (Narrow)	SVM (Narrow)	SVM (Narrow)
Tobin's Q	-0.043*** (0.006)		-0.044*** (0.007)	
EBITDA/Asset		-0.278*** (0.068)		-0.286*** (0.071)
Ln(Assets)	0.009* (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)	0.010 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.235	0.250	0.252	0.266
Observation	5588	6860	5588	6860

Table 9b: Risk Management

The regression below spans 1955 to 2020. The sample below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue in the annual list of Fortune 500. Risk Mgt (Risk Management) is an indicator of whether a firm espouses Risk Management as an objective in its shareholder letter in a year. Book leverage and Interest Expense/EBITDA (i.e., inverse interest coverage) are calculated from COMPUSTAT, then winsorized at 1% for outliers. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. The inclusion of year and industry (Fama-French 30) fixed effects are indicated underneath. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
	Risk Mgt	Risk Mgt	Risk Mgt	Risk Mgt
Book Leverage	0.186*** (0.033)		0.193*** (0.035)	
Interest Expense/EBITDA		0.276*** (0.039)		0.240*** (0.040)
Ln(Assets)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.005)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.128	0.138	0.157	0.164
Observation	6838	6765	6838	6765

Table 9c: EPA Fines and Firm's Espousal of ESG Environment Goal

The regression below spans from 1974 to 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the 30 largest financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the firm espouses the ESG Environment goal in their shareholder letter. EPA Penalty is the US dollar amount of federal, state, and local penalties charged to the firm. The number of EPA penalties reflects the number of case settlements that result in a penalty. The number of cases registered represents the cases lodged against the corporation in a given year with the EPA. The data are from the US Environmental Protection Agency's Integrated Compliance Enforcement System - Federal Enforcement and Compliance case-wise database. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All Specification control for FF-30 Industry and Year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)
	ESG Environment	ESG Environment	ESG Environment
Ln (EPA Penalty) _{t-1}	0.009*** (0.003)		
No. of EPA Penalties _{t-1}		0.092*** (0.035)	
No. of Cases Registered _{t-1}			0.055 (0.036)
Constant	0.222*** (0.005)	0.223*** (0.005)	0.224*** (0.005)
Industry & Year FE	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.272	0.271	0.271
Observations	5345	5345	5345

Table 10a: Employee Goal and NBER Value Added Per Employee

The regression below spans from 1958 to 2018. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the 30 largest financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the firm espouses the Employee goal in their shareholder letter. SIC 4-digit industry-level Ln(Payroll/Employee) for manufacturing firms is sourced from the NBER-CES Productivity Database. 1955-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009 are indicator variables for those decades. All specifications control for year fixed effects. Columns II and IV control for Fama-French 30 Industries Fixed-Effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
	Employees			
SIC Ln(Payroll/Employee)	0.181*** (0.0441)	0.188** (0.0753)	0.181* (0.105)	0.0957 (0.124)
1955-1969=1 # SIC Ln(Payroll/Employee)			-0.205 (0.138)	-0.279 (0.174)
1970-1979=1 # SIC Ln(Payroll/Employee)			-0.117 (0.150)	-0.195 (0.173)
1980-1989=1 # SIC Ln(Payroll/Employee)			-0.134 (0.148)	-0.141 (0.162)
1990-1999=1 # SIC Ln(Payroll/Employee)			0.477*** (0.141)	0.573*** (0.151)
2000-2009=1 # SIC Ln(Payroll/Employee)			-0.101 (0.144)	-0.00728 (0.146)
Constant	-1.553*** (0.444)	-1.626** (0.758)	-1.304*** (0.417)	-0.432 (0.915)
Observations	2621	2621	2621	2621
R-squared	0.137	0.156	0.146	0.167
Industry-FE		Y		Y
Year-FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Table 10b: Innovation Goal and R&D Intensity

The regression below spans from 1976 to 2006 as the PDP database covers only the period 1976-2006. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue in the annual list of Fortune 500. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the firm espouses the Innovation goal in their shareholder letter. R&D Expense/Asset is calculated from COMPUSTAT, then winsorized at 1% for outliers. Ln(Patent) is the natural log of number of patents filed by a firm in a year, and Ln(Citation) is the natural log of total number of citations received by the patents of a firm within 5 years since they were filed. Both are calculated using data from the NBER patent data project (PDP). We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. The inclusion of year and industry (Fama-French 30) fixed effects are indicated underneath. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)
	Innovation	Innovation	Innovation	Innovation	Innovation	Innovation
R&D Expense/Asset	3.762*** (0.241)			1.840*** (0.308)		
Ln(Patent)		0.070*** (0.004)			0.041*** (0.005)	
Ln(Citation)			0.053*** (0.003)			0.029*** (0.004)
Ln(Assets)	0.024*** (0.008)	-0.053*** (0.007)	-0.049*** (0.007)	0.029*** (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.195	0.179	0.172	0.262	0.232	0.229
Observation	3913	4596	4596	3913	4596	4596

Table 11: Pharma Companies, the Opioid Crisis, and the Proliferation of Goals

The regression below spans 2006-2020. The dependent variable in each column is an indicator for whether the firm espouses the goal in that column. Big 7 is a dummy equal to 1 for McKesson, Walmart, CVS, Cardinal Health, Walgreens, AmerisourceBergen and Johnson & Johnson. These firms were hit with the highest amount of fines by the DEA between 2007 and 2016, amounting to more than 500 million dollars, mainly on charges of high distribution of opioids to several low-density counties. Post 2015 is a dummy equal to 1 for all the years after 2015. We restrict the sample to pharmaceutical, wholesale and retail sectors as defined under FF30 industry classification. We control for firm size using Ln(Assets) which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. All specifications use Fama-French industry fixed effects and year-fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust Standard Errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
	Performance Goals			
	Shareholder Value (Narrow)	Market Share Growth	Innovation	Risk Management
The big7	0.0593 (0.0658)	0.00635 (0.0474)	-0.136** (0.0553)	-0.0194 (0.0527)
Post_2015 # The big7	0.224** (0.113)	0.143* (0.0771)	0.180* (0.100)	0.101 (0.0982)
Ln(Assets)	-0.0383 (0.0319)	-0.0365 (0.0257)	0.0690** (0.0270)	-0.0534** (0.0263)
Constant	0.802** (0.317)	1.209*** (0.255)	-0.226 (0.269)	0.758*** (0.263)
Industry & Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.0434	0.0449	0.240	0.0537
Observations	649	649	649	649

	(V)	(VI)	(VII)	(VIII)	(IX)	(X)	(XI)	(XII)	(XIII)	
	Stakeholder Goals					Social Goals				
	Community	Customer	Employee	Stakeholder	Supplier	ESG Environment	ESG Social	Ethics	Philanthropy	
The big7	-0.0256 (0.0602)	-0.0571 (0.0436)	-0.124* (0.0642)	0.0196 (0.0451)	-0.00749 (0.0356)	-0.0245 (0.0420)	0.0302 (0.0422)	-0.0628 (0.0455)	-0.136*** (0.0447)	
Post_2015 # The big7	0.0814 (0.105)	0.128*** (0.0465)	0.145 (0.113)	0.310*** (0.102)	-0.0564 (0.0611)	0.215** (0.0952)	0.135 (0.106)	0.193** (0.0973)	0.102 (0.116)	
Ln(Assets)	0.127*** (0.0291)	0.0125 (0.0150)	0.0898*** (0.0297)	-0.0265 (0.0214)	-0.0173 (0.0178)	0.0591** (0.0246)	0.0294 (0.0247)	0.0427* (0.0251)	0.0779*** (0.0255)	
Constant	-0.875*** (0.286)	0.795*** (0.149)	-0.348 (0.295)	0.410* (0.213)	0.277 (0.178)	-0.357 (0.244)	-0.142 (0.245)	-0.233 (0.249)	-0.521** (0.251)	
Industry & Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
R-squared	0.188	0.0785	0.0893	0.0914	0.0573	0.200	0.186	0.130	0.124	
Observations	649	649	649	649	649	649	649	649	649	

Table 12: Non-financial Goals and their Share in Executive Compensation

The sample is composed of the years 2008, 2013, 2018, and 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500 for the above defined years that provide a proxy statement (also known as DEF-14A) identified through the SEC EDGAR database for the years 2008, 2013, 2018, and 2020. The dependent variable is the percentage of CEO compensation devoted to the specific goal for the column, identified in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis section. The explanatory variables are an indicator equal to 1 if the respective goal is present in the annual letter to shareholders. We include indicators for the years 2008, 2013, and 2018 and control for firm size using Ln(Assets), which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)	(VIII)	(IX)	(X)	
	Performance Goals		Stakeholder Goals				Social Goals				
	Risk Management	Innovation	Community	Customer	Employee	Supplier	Stakeholder	ESG Environment	ESG Social	Ethics	
Goals	-0.0405 (0.0348)	0.177*** (0.0605)	0.0158 (0.0117)	0.142 (0.0946)	-0.0618 (0.0699)	-0.0347 (0.0328)	0.0125 (0.0231)	0.0623** (0.0274)	0.103* (0.0596)	0.0355 (0.0257)	
Ln(Assets)	0.0448*** (0.0125)	-0.0118 (0.0218)	0.000556 (0.00406)	0.0161 (0.0248)	-0.0181 (0.0250)	-0.00982* (0.00507)	0.0121* (0.00700)	-0.00906 (0.00985)	-0.0103 (0.0182)	0.0104 (0.00816)	
2013	0.0116 (0.0460)	-0.149* (0.0824)	0.00723 (0.0152)	-0.234** (0.0934)	-0.0875 (0.0939)	0.00905 (0.0188)	-0.00685 (0.0263)	0.0267 (0.0372)	0.00587 (0.0678)	-0.0148 (0.0309)	
2018	-0.0416 (0.0482)	0.228*** (0.0851)	-0.00541 (0.0160)	0.0653 (0.0968)	0.359*** (0.0977)	0.00713 (0.0195)	-0.0246 (0.0273)	0.0597 (0.0387)	0.0407 (0.0725)	-0.0188 (0.0319)	
2020	0.0553 (0.0458)	0.141* (0.0813)	0.0317** (0.0156)	-0.00255 (0.0923)	0.0857 (0.0951)	0.0352* (0.0186)	0.0261 (0.0267)	-0.00290 (0.0381)	0.0872 (0.0747)	0.110*** (0.0305)	
Constant	-0.461*** (0.134)	0.275 (0.241)	-0.0118 (0.0445)	0.0345 (0.277)	0.522* (0.274)	0.117** (0.0563)	-0.101 (0.0772)	0.116 (0.110)	0.276 (0.200)	-0.100 (0.0901)	
R-squared	0.0414	0.0662	0.0250	0.0330	0.0512	0.0164	0.0182	0.0204	0.0203	0.0641	
Observations	447	447	447	447	447	447	447	447	447	447	

Table 13a: Sustainalytics

The regression below spans 2010 to 2019. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue and the largest 30 financial firms by assets in the annual list of Fortune 500. ESG-weighted scores from Sustainalytics are the dependent variables. Sustainalytics rates companies on Environmental, Social and Governance parameters, where it scores the firms yearly between 0-100, with 100 representing the best possible rating. The table is divided into two Panels - A and B each for a Sustainalytics metric as the dependent variable. Total ESG score is the weighted average of all Environmental, Social and Governance scores indicators. Environmental score is a weighted score on how the company performs on environmental conservation, compliance, policy, emissions and other environmental performance metrics. Social Score is the weighted average metric representing how well a company performs on employee welfare, public relations, fair trade and other societal perception metrics. All specifications use Fama-French industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust Standard Errors are in brackets.

Panel A				
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
	Total ESG Score	Total ESG Score	Environment Score	Social Score
ESG Environment _{t-1}	1.786*** (0.481)		2.980*** (0.717)	
ESG Social _{t-1}		1.305** (0.578)		2.420*** (0.691)
Constant	59.95*** (0.283)	60.44*** (0.230)	59.11*** (0.423)	58.12*** (0.266)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.354	0.349	0.381	0.378
Observations	1134	1134	1133	1133

Table 13b: The dependent variables are Sustainalytics sub scores, which are regressed on ESG Environment or ESG Social, whichever is the applicable goal, lagged one year. The sample ranges from 2010-to-2019. Positive coefficient estimates for the goal indicator that are significant at the 5% level or higher are colored green, while negative coefficient estimates for the goal indicator that are significant at the 5% level or higher are colored orange. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects.

		= Positive and Significant
		= Negative and Significant
Outcome	Environmental Sub-Scores	Social Sub-scores
	Coefficient on L.ESG Environment	Coefficient on L.ESG Social
	Environmental Fines and Non-monetary Sanctions	Employee Turnover Rate
	Operations Related Controversies or Incidents	Health and Safety Certifications
	Carbon Intensity	Trend in Lost-Time Incident Rate
	Carbon Intensity Trend	Number of Fatalities
	Oil Spill Reporting and Performance	Social Supply Chain Incidents
	Waste Intensity	Society & Community Related Controversies or Incidents
	Water Intensity	Employee Related Controversies or Incidents
	Environmental Supply Chain Incidents	Percentage of Flights Delayed More Than 15 Minutes
	Products & Services Related Controversies or Incidents	Percentage of Employees Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements
	% Primary Energy Use from Renewables	Top Employer Recognition
	Revenue from Clean Technology or Climate Friendly Products	Customer Related Controversies or Incidents
	Automobile Fleet Average CO2 Emissions	Percentage of Temporary Workers
	Carbon Intensity of Energy Mix	Value of Drug Donations Relative to EBIT
Trend Automobile Fleet Average Fleet Efficiency		
Process/Programs	External Certification of EMS	External QMS Certifications
	External Environmental Certification Suppliers	Policy on Freedom of Association
	Formal Environmental Policy	Percentage of Temporary Workers
	Environmental Management System	Supply Chain Audits
	Participation in Carbon Disclosure Project (Investor CDP)	Programmes to Increase Workforce Diversity
	Scope of Corporate Reporting on GHG Emissions	Formal Policy on Working Conditions
	Programmes and Targets to Reduce GHG Emissions from own operations	Employee Training
	Programmes and Targets to Increase Renewable Energy Use	Programmes and Targets to Reduce Health and Safety Incidents
	Reporting Quality Non-Carbon Environmental Data	Programmes to Address HIV/AIDS Among its Workforce
	Programmes and Targets to Protect Biodiversity	HealthandSafetyManagementSystem
	Guidelines and Reporting on Closure and Rehabilitation of Sites	Scope of Social Supply Chain Standards
	Environmental and Social Impact Assessments	Supply Chain Monitoring System
	Programmes & Targets to Reduce Hazardous Waste Generation	Quality of Social Supply Chain Standards
	Programmes & Targets to Reduce Air Emissions	Membership in the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)
	Programmes & Targets to Reduce Water Use	Policy on Conflict Minerals

	Other Programmes to Reduce Key Environmental Impacts	Conflict Minerals Programmes
	GHG Reduction Programme	Reporting on Supply Chain Monitoring and Enforcement
	Programmes and Targets to Improve the Environmental Performance of Own Logistics	External Social Certification of Suppliers
	Programmes and Targets to Phase out CFCs and HCFCs in Refrigeration Equipment	Fair Trade Products
	Formal Policy or Programme on Green Procurement	Supply Chain Management
	Programmes to Improve the Environmental Performance of Suppliers	
	Programmes and Targets to Stimulate Sustainable Agriculture	Public Position Statement on Responsible Marketing
	Programmes and Targets to Stimulate Sustainable Aquaculture/Fisheries	Public Policy Statement on Advertising Ethics
	Food Beverage & Tobacco Industry Initiatives	Policy Statement on Data Privacy
	Programmes and Targets to Reduce GHG Emissions from Outsourced Logistics Service	Programmes to Minimise Health Impact of Electronic and Magnetic Fields
	Data on Percentage of Recycled/Re-used Raw Material Used	Outsourcing of Core Editorial Tasks
	Data on Percentage of FSC Certified Wood/Pulp as Raw Material	Corporate Wide Editorial Guidelines
	Programmes and Targets to Promote Sustainable Food Products	Policy on Conflicts of Interest
	Food Retail Initiatives	Public Position Statement on Health Consequences of Products
	Sustainability Related Products & Services	Programmes and Targets to Reduce Energy/Water Use by Customers
	Systematic Integration of Environmental Considerations at R&D Stage (Eco-design)	Adherence to WHO Ethical Criteria for Medicinal Drug Promotion
	Programmes and Targets for End-of-Life Product Management	Activities in Sensitive Countries
	Organic Products	Human Rights Policy
	Policy on Use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) in Products	Community Engagement Programmes
	Environmental & Social Standards in Credit and Loan Business	Programmes and Targets to Promote Access to Financial Services for Disadvantaged
	Responsible Asset Management	Policies and Management Systems on Access to Medicines
	Sustainability Related Financial Services	Programmes and Initiatives to Develop Medicines for Neglected Diseases
	Emergency Response Programme-Weighted Score	Equitable Pricing Programmes for Medicines
		Policies on Access to Health Care
		Programmes to Support Independent Media
		Policy on Indigenous People and Land Rights
		Policies and Programmes to Promote Access to Basic Services
		Local Community Development Programmes
		Programmes to Address Digital Divide
		Policy on Drug Donations
		Guidelines for Philanthropic Activities and Primary Areas of Support
		Corporate Foundation
		Percent Cash Donations of NEBT

Table 14: Espousal of Goals and Long-Term Performance

The regression below spans 1955 to 2020. The Fortune-150 sample used below includes the largest 120 non-financial firms by revenue in the annual list of Fortune 500. The dependent variable is the firm's 5-years-ahead performance. Asset growth is measured as the growth in firm assets over 5-years. Revenue growth is measured as the growth in the firm's total revenue over 5-years. Cumulative stock returns are computed for every 5-year period. Growth in EBITDA by revenue is computed for each firm for a period of 5 years. Growth in dividend per share is computed for each firm for a period of 5 years. All financial variables are sourced from COMPUSTAT. Explanatory variables include indicators for goals Shareholder Value Narrow and Market Share Growth, the firm's profitability measured as EBITDA/Assets, Leverage measured as Total Debt/Assets, and firm size measured as Ln (Assets). All specifications have Fama-French industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Newey-West standard errors are used to adjust for autocorrelation up to the lag of 3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust Standard Errors are in brackets.

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)	(VIII)	(IX)	(X)
	Asset growth over 5-years	Revenue growth over 5-years	Cumulative Stock Return over 5-years	Growth in EBITDA/Revenue over 5 years	Growth In Dividend-per-share over 5-years					
Shareholder Value Narrow	-0.073** (0.032)	-0.072** (0.031)	-0.079*** (0.026)	-0.073*** (0.026)	-0.104 (0.093)	-0.084 (0.078)	0.010 (0.050)	0.006 (0.055)	-0.018 (0.103)	-0.017 (0.104)
Market Share Growth		-0.006 (0.024)		-0.039* (0.021)		-0.148 (0.123)		0.031 (0.068)		-0.006 (0.035)
Profitability	1.836*** (0.232)	1.836*** (0.232)	0.477** (0.197)	0.477** (0.197)	-3.094** (1.376)	-3.086** (1.367)	-0.494 (1.079)	-0.494 (1.079)	0.084 (0.351)	0.084 (0.351)
Leverage	-0.554*** (0.126)	-0.553*** (0.126)	-0.349*** (0.108)	-0.346*** (0.107)	-0.206 (0.448)	-0.191 (0.437)	-0.243 (0.207)	-0.246 (0.204)	-0.262 (0.327)	-0.262 (0.327)
Ln(Assets)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.057*** (0.012)	-0.221 (0.154)	-0.223 (0.155)	0.005 (0.028)	0.005 (0.028)	0.097 (0.079)	0.097 (0.079)
Constant	-0.374** (0.180)	-0.370* (0.215)	-0.300 (0.294)	-0.269*** (0.087)	-0.038 (0.438)	-0.021 (0.442)	-0.036 (0.388)	-0.067 (0.209)	-0.358 (0.259)	-0.352 (0.258)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.144	0.144	0.207	0.208	0.069	0.071	0.017	0.017	0.049	0.049
Observations	5612	5612	5611	5611	4930	4930	5604	5604	5158	5158